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SUMMARY:

ISSUES:
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Timely

Does a state program of

secular, supplementary instruction, conducted in classrooms of
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violate the Establishment Clause?
{2)
Is there general
~-~.J is 3'"''de~( rt sl-..vil k.')( l,c (,Ju
10 J. I
w;~h No~. <gJ -~IJ 2 ~ - "! '}...~ t_!,lo," r. "\.1 s.·~'>·Jv.f Co-x'Hotv_
L'-1.

J,Jf., (
.;r.. H....,/... n

t

11/fb.?<•,

a. 1 ..-~ r/,g,f 1t,e

I/

•·CJY11'•rt

v/n/..2.4-vu

rewlt be/,;.-y

'-a.•f

.2 r?-/:r lf

,·s tJPe.If-;r;ry,a.U·

:t?'1r~n.,:'"t)
But

,f

r.s

A.s ~ Vl'td~Y&/
ve.v7

t.c.,£

1b

/,

,.,fviHifrl,

J..,Jn·"!v'JL ~

-

2 -

"taxpayer standing" to bring a suit challenging such a
program?
2.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

The Grand Rapids School

District (GRSD) has for 6 years offered "shared time" and
"community education" classes on the premises of nonpublic
(including parochial) schools.

This program is authorized,

though not mandated, by Michigan law.

GRSD provides the

instructors for the classes, and leases classroom space from
the nonpublic schools.

No religious symbols or artifacts may

be displayed in the classrooms, and instructors are required
to post a sign within the class area designating it as a
public school classroom.
All the instruction is

~ecular )

The "shared time"

classes (remedial and enrichment math and reading, art, music,

--------

and phys ed) take place during regular school hours.
offered at both elementary and secondary levels.

They are

None of

these classes replace or supplant classes otherwise offered by
the nonpublic schools.

They are designed merely as a

supplement to the normal education, a blend of remedial,
advanced and enrichment courses.

The DC found that about 10%

of a nonpublic school student's time was taken up with such
courses.

The classes were open to all students eligible to

attend a public school.

As a practical matter, however, since

such courses were already available in the public schools,
those attending the courses at a given nonpublic school were
those enrolled in that school.

- 3 The "community education" classes (model building, arts

~--

and crafts, typing, etc.) are scheduled outside regular school
hours.

The teachers of these classes are employed part-time

by GRSD, and the majority of them are employed full-time by
the situs school, whether public or private.
Six state taxpayer pls and one institutional pl
(Americans United for Separation of Church and State) brought
suit in DC, challenging the constitutionality of providing
these courses on premises leased from and otherwise occupied
by religious schools.

The institutional pl was dismissed by

the DC for lack of standing.

But the individual pls

prevailed, and the DC permanently enjoined GRSD from
continuing to operate and conduct these programs on the
premises of nonpublic schools.
Applying the three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403

u.s.

602 (1971), the DC found, first, that
<

t~urpose

of the

program was "manifestly secular" and that there was "no basis
to form a conclusion that there was any purpose or intent to
advance reli*

unconstitutionally."

Second, however, the DC

found that

~rimary effect" of the program was to advance

religion.

Parochial school children compose over 80% of the

benefitted class (i.e., the class of all those nonpublic

-

school children participating).

There is also a "potential"

for advancing religious doctrines in the program, since

~

of the teachers in the shared-time program and many in the
community-education program were formerly or are still
employed by the nonpublic schools to which they were assigned

- 4 by GRSD.

More fundamentally, the challenged courses are

conducted in the "sectarian atmosphere" of the religious
schools.

Finally, the program confers substantial financial

benefits on the parochial schools by employing and paying from
tax funds the numerous instructors who teach subjects in the
leased classrooms.

entanglement of government with religion.

There is a

potential for political divisiveness--some will want to spend
the money to help the church schools and others won't.

Also,

in order to ensure that no religious doctrine creeps into the
instruction, GRSD must monitor the goings-on at the religious
schools leading to excessive administrative entanglement.

In

sum, the workings of the program require too much
intermingling of public and nonpublic personnel, courses and
other materials.
A divided CA6 affirmed.

The CA acknowledged that there

was no proof that any teacher in the program sought in the
classes to indoctrinate any student in accordance with the
school's religious persuasion.

But the CA found that four

signficant features of the program rendered it

----------------------------------------

unc~ (1) it is primarily a program of assistance \~
to elementary schools; (2) it gives substantial financial aid
to education in parochial school buildings; (3) the parochial
schools concerned have religious indoctrination as a primary
school purpose; and (4) the impact upon the taxpayers and the
parochial schools is direct.

The majority also expressed a

- 5 -

curious concern that this same sort of program, if
legitimized, might spread nationwide and be applied to "less
orthodox religious sects" who would act with more religious
zeal and less social responsibility than the church schools at
iss~ere.

Judge Krupansky dissented, claiming that the majority
ignored the actual operational history of the program.
Absolutely no evidence of indoctrination or attempted
indoctrination exists during the six years of the program's
operation.

The majority merely adopts a per se rule that

conducting courses on premises owned by nonpublic schools
violates the Establishment Clause.
More specifically, the dissent challenged the primary
purpose conclusion of the majority.

The class of

beneficiaries is all students, not just the nonpublic

-

~

students, since the shared time and community education
courses are available at public schools as well (as part of
the extensive regular curriculum) and not just at the
challenged nonpublic schools.

Moreover, there is no direct

--------------

financial benefit to the parochial schools since the courses
are all supplemental and not part of the core curriculum which
must be offered as a condition of state accreditation.

Nor

was there any evidence that this expanded supplemental
curriculum has resulted in an increase in enrollments at the
participating schools.

Finally, the majority's reliance on

hypothetical speculation as to the potential for religious

'-

. I
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indoctrination is inappropriate, especially in view of a
record which shows the contrary.
As for excessive entanglement, the dissent saw very
little of it in this case.

The mere unrealized possibility

that an instructor might try to use the program for religious
means does not require incessant monitoring.

There is time

5~

enough to deal with that problem if it arises.

Finally, the dissent argues that the pls lacked standing.
In Valley Forge Christian College, 102 S.Ct. 752 (1982), the
Court held that a federal taxpayer will possess standing as a
taxpayer only where the challenged spending or fiscal
appropriations derive from a legislative enactment promulgated
in accordiance with the taxing and spending clause of Art. I,
§8.

By analogy, a state taxpayer must challenge

appropriations derived from the state's constitutional
equivalent to Art. I, §8.

The pls here have not challenged

any statutory provision.

They brought suit directly against

GRSD and sought only a declaration that the leasing and shared
time arrangments violated the Establishment Clause.

That is,

they simply challenged executive decisions, not exercises of
legislative power.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petrs argue that the CA6's per se,

geographic ruling flies in the face of this Court's constant
admonition to consider the facts of each case in deciding
Establishment Clause issues.

See, e.g., Comm. for Public

Educ. and Religious Liberty, 444

u.s.

646, 662 (1980).

More

specifically, petrs repeat the arguments of Judge Krupansky on

- 7 the issues of "primary purpose" and "excessive entanglement."
They further observe that there has been, in fact, little or
no public controversy over the program, which is paid for out
of general GRSD funds, rather than requiring specific
appropriations.
Petrs further argue that the CA6's decision unduly limits
the flexibility of States in meeting the educational needs of
all school-age children.

Past opinions of this Court have

allowed States to provide many forms of assistance to
nonpublic schools, including transportation, textbooks, and
diagnostic, therapeutic and remedial services. See, e.g.,
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330

u.s.

Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).

Shared time and community

1 (1947); Bd. of Educ. v.

education programming, both effective means of improving
overall education, should not be relegated to the scrapheap-at least, not without review of this Court.
Barrer, 417

u.s.

In Wheeler v.

402 (1974), the Court left open a similar

question (in the context of remedial services provided under
Title I) as to whether educational services may be provided to
nonpublic school students at religiously-oriented nonpublic
schools.
Petrs also point out that the CA6's decision is in direct
conflict with decisions of the Michigan appellate courts
approving the program.

See Traverse City School District v.

Attorney General, 185 N.W.2d 9 (Mich. 1971); Citizens to
Advance Public Educ. v. State Superintendent of Public
Instruction, 237 N.W.2d 232 (Mich. App. 1975).

.

.

.

'
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Finally, petrs argue that the pls had no standing under
Valley Forge.
Resps argue that there is little or no difference between
the GRSD program and the "purchase of secular services"
invalidated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403

u.s.

602 {1971), or the

supplemental salary program invalidated in Earley v. DiCenso,
403

u.s.

602 {1971).

The end result is to supplement with tax

dollars the teaching of important parts of the curriculum of
sectarian schools.

The "leases" are merely a fiction to

facilitate this scheme.

The decision below is also compatible

with the great weight of lower court decisions on "lease"
programs.

See 485 F.Supp. 432 {WD Mich 1980); 337 F.Supp. 545

{D Vt 1972); 359 F.Supp. 505 {D NH 1973); 507 P2d 839 {Or App
1973); 369 F.Supp. 1059 {ED Ky 1974).

Two apparently contrary

decisions are distinguishable on their facts because in one,
195 NW2d 161 {Neb.), cert denied, 409

u.s.

921 {1972),

students from both public and private schools attended the
classes, and in the other, 489 F.Supp. 1248 {SD NY 1980),
appeal dismissed, 449

u.s.

808, the DC found that the schools

were not "pervasively sectarian," that there were only minor
administrative contacts, and that the program had not
generated any political divisiveness.
Resps further argue that petrs mischaracterize the CA6's
decision, which does not involve a per se geographic ruling
that the program is unconstitutional merely because conducted
in religious schools.

Rather, the CA6 found considerable

- 9 -

entanglement, which threatened to bring about a virtual merger
of the public and nonpublic school systems.
Finally, resps argue that any standing problem is merely
a matter of a technical deficiency in the pleadings, which can
be corrected at any time by an amendment under FRCP 15(b).
The statutory authority for the challenged program is clear,
and was cited and discussed by the DC.

Thus, petrs had

taxpayer standing based on the record evidence at trial.
4.

DISCUSSION:

I don't think petrs'

(or the dissent's)

characterization of the CA6's decision, as a per se geographic
prohibition, is unfair.

No specific findings as to instances

of (as opposed to general assumptions of the potential for)
indoctrination, political divisiveness, and administrative
entanglement were made.

The reasoning of the CA6 would

invalidate any such program, regardless of the particular
circumstances.
The question raised here has never been directly resolved
---~

by this Court, although Meek v. Pittenger, 421
(1975), is pretty close.
important.

u.s.

349

Also, the question is undoubtedly

~

A widespread and apparently effective supplemental

education program, approved by the state legislature and
courts, carried on for 6 years and affecting thousands of
students, has been invalidated by a federal court in sweeping
terms.

The case is, in a sense, factbound; but so are all

Establishment Clause questions.

The only thing settled about

the law in this area is the [~~rm of
purpose," "primary

eff~ct,"

wor~~nvoked:

"secular

and "excessive entanglement."

No

- 10 -

one really seems to have a very clear idea what these phrases
mean or where exactly the line is to be drawn.

This case

could provide the Court with an opportunity to chart another
portion of the boundary.
Furthermore, I think the CA6 was probably wrong, despite

.

The obvious purpose and primary effect of this program ( 7/Z)~
is secular: to raise the level of education in the populace at ~~

Meek.

large.

Surely the State has not only a compelling interest,

but also a fundamental obligation, to advance that purpose.
Moreover, the program is administered in a neutral manner.
All nonpublic schools may participate, whether religious or
not, and the courses offered are identical to those
supplemental courses offered in public schools.

Given the

formalized procedures for leasing classrooms and ensuring that
they are free of all religious symbols and artifacts, there
seems to be little danger of excessive entanglement.

The

State exercises control over all the teachers, just as it does
in its own classrooms on the premises of public schools.
In Meek, however, the Court declared unconstitutional a
program providing "auxiliary services" (such as counseling,
speech and hearing therapy, teaching for exceptional and
remedial students, etc.) in nonpublic schools.

The teachers

in that program were hired by the State and were not under the
control of the parochial schools.

The court specifically

declined to decide "whether substantial state expenditures to
enrich the curricula of church-related elementary and
secondary schools, like the expenditure of state funds to

- 11 -

support the basic educational program of those schools,
necessarily result in the direct and substantial advancement
of religious activity."

349 U.S., at 369.

But the Court did

find an excessive entanglement based on the need constantly to
monitor the activities of the teachers to be sure that they
don't advance the religious mission of the schools while on
the public payroll.

"The fact that the teachers and

counselors providing auxiliary services are employees of the
public intermediate unit, rather than of the church-related
schools in which they work, does not substantially eliminate
the need for continuing surveillance."

Id., at 371.

The

Court also found a serious potential for political
divisiveness over the issue of aid to religion.
The instant case is distinguishable on the grounds
special care has been taken to ensure a "public school"
enclave in the midst of the private schools.

Surely, GRSD

could constitutionally make all these courses available to
private school students away from the nonpublic schools.

It

seems silly to hold that GRSD can do exactly the same thing it
is doing now, but that it must do so at other locations, at
greater expense to itself and greater inconvenience to the
students.

Furthermore, with all respect, the reasoning in

Meek makes little sense.

-------------..

There is no more need to monitor a

~

public school teacher temporarily on a parochial campus than
there is to monitor one teaching at a public school.
Indoctrination could be attempted in either event.

Unless one

feels that religion is as contagious as swine flu, there is no

< ;
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reason to fear that the mere act of walking onto a parochial
school campus and proceeding to the religiously antiseptic
classroom will cause the teacher of a secular subject to begin
spouting sectarian cant instead of remedial math.

At any

rate, the 6-year track record of this particular program, with
no recorded instances of abuse and substantial benefits for
all, should not be simply disregarded.
On the standing question, resps are probably correct that
more artful pleading could have gotten them around the Valley
Forge problem.

At any rate, the issue does not seem to merit

independent review.

Given the apparently widespread use of these lease-time
programs, the important state interest in raising the
'------------

educational standards of all citizens, the conflicting
decisions among the lower courts, and the arguably erroneous
result below, I recommend that the petition be GRANTED.
There is a response.

January 27, 1984

Kellogg
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:
Re:

Joe
No. 83-990 School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball

This case was relisted for you.

Before Conference, I r ecom-

mended that if this case were granted, it should be set for argument with Nos.
Jaffree

83-812 & 83-929 Mobile County School Commrs.

(moment-of-silence cases) ,

which was

scheduled

for

v.
the

February 17, 1984 Conference and which I expected would be grant-

4

ed.
As

- ----

You asked me to ascertain the status of the Mobile cases.
it turns out,

they were stricken from the February 17 list

because Justice Stevens called for a response.
the call was not

limited

to a particular

(Unfortunately,

uestion.

Thus,

the

response probably will address at length the question of whether
this Court's school prayer cases should be overruled.)
think

the fact

I do not

that Mobile will not be considered for

several

more weeks affects whether the present case should be granted;
the cases are related only in that they both deal with religion
in the schools, but oth~rwise the issues are fairly distinct.

So

I think the only reason to take this case is if you are inclined
to

reconsider

(1975),
case.

which

your
is

vote

not

in

Meek

v.

significantly

Pittenger,

421

distinguishable

u.s.
from

Meek was 6-3 when Justice Stewart was on the Court.

Al·d.ou3 ~
reconsideration, my recommendation tentatively

349
this
On

fl.t. ~verti(lh ,:r -r,-oiJ /,/u,n•..,,.J
is DENY. ~inality
~

/1

concerns suggest that the issue should be allowed to lie where
Meek left it.
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This case was relisted for you.

Before Conference, I recom-

mended that if this case were granted, it should be set for argument with Nos.
Jaffree

83-812

&

83-929 Mobile County School Commrs.

(moment-of-silence cases),

which was scheduled

for

v.
the

February 17, 1984 Conference and which I expected would be grant-

4

ed.
As

You asked me to ascertain the status of the Mobile cases.
it turns out,

-

they were stricken from the February 17 list

because Justice Stevens called for a response.
the call was not

limited

to a particular

(Unfortunately,

uestion.

Thus,

the

response probably will address at length the question of whether
this Court's school prayer cases should be overruled.)
think

the fact

I do not

that Mobile will not be considered for

several

more weeks affects whether the present case should be granted;
the cases are related only in that they both deal with religion
in the schools, but oth~rwise the issues are fairly distinct.

So

I think the only reason to take this case is if you are inclined
to

reconsider

(1975),
case.

which

your
is

vote

not

in

Meek

v.

significantly

Pittenger,

421

distinguishable

u.s.
from

Meek was 6-3 when Justice Stewart was on the Court.

A/t Lo•a L H.. !. 1JVUtitrn
reconsideration, my recommendation tentatively is DENY.
~

concerns suggest that the
Meek left it.
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December 6, 1984

MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:

Lynda

Re: Aguilar v. Felton and School District of Grand Rapids v.
Ball: Distinctions between the Grand Rapids programs and New
York's Title I program

Following are the major attributes of the programs at
issue in these cases:

leases the classroom space used for the
program from the religious school.
(2) No religious artifacts may be displayed in the leased
space, but they do exist in surrounding areas.
(3) The class area must be posted as a public school
classroom, although there are no such signs posted outside the
nonpublic school.
(4) The students attending the Shared Time classes are the ~ ~
/U~
same ones who attend the nonpublic school regularly.
(5) Teachers are employed according to ordinary hiring
procedures of the Grand Rapids School District, but a

..

..

...

•

portion taught previously in the nonpublic schools, and many were
assigned to the same such school in which they previously taught.
(6) Typical course offerings are math, reading, physical
education, art, and music, although others have been offered.
The courses are in all instances supplemental and not required
for graduation, and are offered during the school day.

- - -

leases the classroom space from the
religious school, and the same restrictions on posting the

~

space ~

and removing religious artifacts apply.

~

(2) The courses are offered after regular school hours, are
and include leisure-type courses, as well as
substantive vocational courses such as typing, computer

~luntary,

programming, bookkeeping, etc.

_

(3) Most of
.. the Community Education teachers are also full-

--

.
'L
'
. t h e same sc h oo 1 wh ere t h e
pr1vate
sc h ool teac h ers'' 1n
t1me

-

Cbmmunity Education courses are offered.
(4) The courses offered are not available as part of the
regular curricula at the private schools, but are supplementary
and not required for graduation.
(5) The students attending the courses are the same as those

$

~ ~

who regularly attend the school where the courses are offered. ~~

Title I
(1) Title I funds are available only to educationally deprived

children residing in low-income areas.

The funds are to be made

available to such children in private schools on a basis
"comparable" to that available to public school children.
(2) Instruction may be provided on the premises of the private
school only to the extent necessary to make the services
available, and services may be provided only if not provided by
the private school itself.
(3) Title I funds may not be used to pay private school
teachers or employees except for services performed outside their
regular hours of duty, under public supervision and control.
(4) The Local Educational Agency ("LEA"), which directs the
~e

of the local Title I funds, must maintain exclusive direction

and control over all Title I funds and services; no public funds
may be disbursed to the private schools.
(5) The LEA must maintain title to and physical control over
any instructional materials used, and must remove it from the
private school's premises, if necessary to prevent its being used
for other than Title I purposes.
(6) If the state or LEA fails to comply with these
requirements, the funds will be terminated, and misspent funds
will be recouped.
(7) Five types of remedial instruction_ are provided:

in

reading, reading skills, math, English as a second language, and
clinical and guidance services.

- --

(8) Instructors and support staff are all employed by the

--

local school board and are subject solely to its supervision and
control.

-------~---------

Assignment of a public school teacher to a Title I

program is voluntary on the teacher's part, and private school

officials have no voice in the initial assignment.

No inquiry is

made as to religious affiliation, and they do not play a role in
assignment.

Most of the teachers are itinerant, spending less

than five days a week at the same school.
(9) Teachers are given detailed written and oral instructions
delineating their responsibilities and the restrictions on their
activities.

They have ultimate control over the selection of

students who participate: they are not to engage in team
teaching, though they may discuss progress and needs with the
student's regular teacher: and they are directed not to introduce
religious topics into their teaching.

Teachers are subject to

periodic evaluations and direct supervision by the local school
board.
(10) The classrooms used are denuded of religious symbols, and
none of the Title I materials have religious content.

A

comprehensive recordkeeping and inventory system is in force to
prevent misuse of the instructional materials.
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:

Re:
Ball:

Lynda
Aguilar v. Felton and School District of Grand Rapids v.
Distinctions Between the Programs Involved
As you will see from the attached list of attributes

possessed by each program, the major difference between the Title
I program and the Grand Rapids programs is that Title I has a
complex and

fe~led

set?!

the teachers involved.

: eg Qla t ~ onE\ governing

the program and

Care has been taken in the Title I

program to neutralize, to the fullest extent possible, every
aspect of contact between the private school and the Title I
teachers going in to teach.

If there is any program that may be

~

upheld, it is Title I.
The Grand Rapids programs are less formally
1

The Shared Time

progra~ ,

sanitized~

which of the two Michigan programs most

ctosely parallels New York's Title I program, involves similar
courses, and teachers are apparently told to refrain from
religious instruction and to keep the instructional materials
separate.

There is apparently no overriding regulatory

structure, however, and some teachers have affiliations with the
private school in which they teach Shared Time courses.

....

..

..

''

l'

V':>
The Community Education program s Eands by itself in
u

that there is vJ irtual identity not only between the religious
__.

~hool

~-

----

~

student body and students taking the courses, but between

------------------~--~------~~----~~----~--

religious school teachers and teachers providing the Community
~ucation

instruction.

I do not find persuasive petr's argument

that the program is valid notwithstanding this identity because
fue courses are mainly leisure-type, voluntary offerings.
not see how the content of the course relates at all to the
possibility of entanglement.

I do

~ g~-qq(J

s~fJ-u~
v.
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:

Lynda

Re: Establishment Clause cases and the effect of advancing
religion prong of the Lemon test

In addition to the part of Meek invalidating the
~structional

materials, your opinion in Committee for Public

Education v. Nyquist, 413

u.s.

756 (1973), was decided on the

advancing religion prong of the Lemon three-part test.

In that

case, the Court invalidated grants to religious schools for
repair and maintenance to ensure student safety)and tuition
reimbursements and tax deductions to parents of children enrolled
in religious schools because they had the primary effect of
advancing religion.

You noted that although some forms of aid

may be channeled to the secular function of religious schools,
11

the channel is a narrow one.

11

!d., at 775.

As to the tuition

reimbursements and tax deductions, you considered that the fact
~at

the aid went to the parents instead of directly to the

religious schools was only one factor to be considered; the
effect of the aid was to provide financial support for religious

-----

~~----------------------------~
institutions, and there was
no effort to distinguish between

""

- ------

secular and religious functions to support only the former.
at 783.

!d.,

The programs were thus invalid under the Establishment

•r

Clause.

You noted that the tuition reimbursement program could

not pass muster under the argument that since the maximum
reimbursement is only 15% of the educational costs in the private
schools, and more than 15% of the schools' time is devoted to
~cular

functions, the reimbursements were valid.

~arantee"

of neutrality is not enough.

"A statistical

Id., at 787.

Nor were

the programs saved by the argument that they were designed to
promote the free exercise of religion.

The State was required to

be neutral as to religion, and these programs, in advancing
religion, were not neutral.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, in Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S.Ct. 1355
(1984), expressed the view that the "effect of advancing
religion" prong of Lemon is "properly interpreted not to require
invalidation of a government practice merely because it in fact
causes, even as a primary effect, advancement or inhibition of
religion," but because it has the "effect of communicating a
message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion."
Id., at 1368.

Under this view, the programs at issue here might

well be valid--especially the Title I program--because of the
painstaking procedures to ensure that the teachers remain free of
religious involvement.

On the other hand, the programs at issue

here might communicate a governmental endorsement of religion by
providing the support and aid that they do.

In short, I believe

that either way you look at the "effect prong" of the test, an
advancement of religion must be found.

~~ - 110 ~

----

~~;-v)_~
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:

Re:
w~

Lynda
Vote Breakdown on Meek v. Pittenger
Justice Stewart announced the judgment of the Court and

1

~delivered
~ ~you,

the opinion of the Court (Parts I, II, IV, and V) in
JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL, JUSTICE BLACKMON,

~Ustice
~ joined

~art

~~~loan

Douglas joined.

JUSTICE BRENNAN, in an opinion

by JUSTICE MARSHALL and Justice Douglas, dissented from

III of Justice Stewart's opinion, which upheld the textbook
program of the Pennsylvania act.

You and JUSTICE BLACKMON

joined Part III of the opinion, and THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE
REHNQUIST, and JUSTICE WHITE joinep the portion of the judgment
upholding the textbook loan program.
Part I of the opinion stated the factual background of
the case.

Part II summarized the relevant Establishment Clause

jurisprudence, including the three-part test developed by Lemon
and applied by its progeny.

Part III of the opinion discussed

the Pennsylvania textbook loan program, and upheld it as
indistinguishable from the New York program upheld in Board of
Education v. Allen, 392

u.s.

236 (1968).

Part IV invalidated the

lo~~~s as f9 nstituting dir~ct aid l ~o the
religious schools, which had the effect of advancing religious

activity.

Part V invalidated the provision of auxiliary
~

-

services, including teachers and counselors to provide remedial
~
'-------·- ------------~ ..
instruction and counseling, because there was a potential for the
impermissible fostering of religion, the prevention of which
would require surveillance and excessive entanglement.

~=

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

December 6, 1984

Lynda

Nos. 84-237, -238, -239

Aguilar, et al. v. Felton, et al.

No. 83-990

School District of Grand Rapids, et al. v. Ball,

et al.
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Question Presented

Whether the provision of supplemental instruction
in

nonpublic

circumstances

schools
of

these

by

public

cases,

teachers,

violates

the

under

the

Establishment

Clause of the First Amendment?

'< l·

..
"'!'
...'
f,e,

...

1>'

~~

..
":'>,-

·:~\

'1.

".,
'!\

,.
r:~f

'

'I

~

I. Background

A. Statutory Background
(1) In Aguilar, the services furnished to students
in

nonpublic

schools

Elementary and

are

authorized

by

Title

Secondary Education Act of 1965,

§2701,

et seq. ,

United

States

I

of
20

the

u.s.c.

which declared it to be the pol icy of the
to

provide

financial

assistance

to

local

educational

institutions serving areas with concentrations

of children

from

such

low-income

institutions

deprived children.

to

meet

families,
the

in order

needs

of

to enable

educationally

Section 2740(a) provides that

To the extent consistent with the number of
educationally deprived children in the school
district
who are enrolled in p~1vate
el~ntary
and
secondary schools,
[the local
educational agency]
shall make ~ovision _ for
including
special
educafionai
services
and
ar
ua enro lment, e ucational
radio and
television,
and mobile educational
services and equipment) in which such children can
participate.
Expenditures for educational
services and arrangements pursuant to this section
• • . shaU be egual (taking into account the
number otc~o be served and the special
educational
needs
of
such
children)
to
expenditures for children enrolled in the public
schools of the local educational agency.
Since 1966, New York City has been receiving federal funds
Ll'lder Title I

to finance programs wherein it sends public

school teachers and other professionals into religious and
other nonpublic schools to provide remedial instruction and
clinical

and

guidance

services

to

students.

The

City's

initial Title I program required the students to travel to

public schools after regular school hours for their remedial
instruction;
were

attendance lagged,

conducted

Attendance
students •
weather.

in

remained
safety

the

nonpublic

poor,

in

however,

and

and some programs

schools

there

was

after

concern

hours.
for

travelling home after dark or

the

in bad

A plan for students to participate in classes with

public school students in public schools during the school
day

was

rejected

because

of

unspecified

violating the New York Constitution.
devised

the

plan

at

issue

here,

concerns

about

Consequently, the City

of

having

public

school

~...t..;$'

fiL.4AA.;

teachers travel to the nonpublic schools during the school
day to provide instruction.

(2)

In Ball,

Mich.

Comp.

Laws

§380.1282 and

its

J;['edecessor provisions have authorized local public school
districts

to

develop

educational

programs

to

meet

local

educational needs, and have authorized the payment of state
school aid funds to local boards of education for provision
of

part-time

instruction

students

in

nonpublic

Pursuant

to

this

School

District

in

schools

general

supplementary
by

public

authorization,

( "GRDS")

set

up

the

subjects

school
the

teachers.

Grand

Shared

regular
Although

are offered

school

hours,

not

required

Rapids

Time

Community Education programs at issue in this case.
Time courses

to

and

Shared

in the nonpublic schools, during

in
for

classrooms
graduation

leased
from

to
the

the

GRDS.

nonpublic

schools, the courses were primarily remedial and enrichment

.

.''
>

instruction

in

music,

physical

and

core

courses

such

as

education.

reading,

Many

of

math,

the

art,

teachers

employed by the GRDS had previously taught in the nonpublic
schools.

The

voluntary,

Community

Education

leisure time offerings,

program

consisted

of

available to interested

students on the leased premises after hours.

Most of the

instructors taught in the nonpublic school during the day,
but were hired as part-time public school employees to teach
the Community Education courses after hours.

B. Facts and Decisions Below
(1)

Aguilar:

In 1976, the National Coalition for

Public Education and Religious Liberty sued the Secretary of
HEW

and

the

Chancellor

of

the

New

York

City

Board

Education to enjoin New York City's program under
providing

of

Title I

instruction in nonpublic schools as violative of

the Establishment Clause.
an extensive

factual

court,

ruled

which

An evidentiary hearing producing

record was held before a
that

the

program

was

three-judge

constitutional.

Coalition for Public Education & Religious Liberty

~tional

("PEARL")

v.

Harris,

489 F.

Supp.

1248

(SONY 1980).

This

Court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction because
it was

untimely

filed.

449

u.s.

808

(1980).

Meanwhile,

this action was brought by 6 federal taxpayers in DC in the
EDNY, but was stayed pending final determination of PEARL.
Four

parents

of

children

remedial assistance

:

...

in

nonpublic

schools

intervened as defendants.

receiving

The parties

5.

stipulated

the

case

was

in

PEARL,

with

some

Neaher

agreed

with

the

developed
Judge

that

to

be

tried

on

supplementary
PEARL

the

record

affidavits.

court's

result,

and

reversed.

In

dismissed the complaint.
CA2
what

is

ever

(Feinberg,

one of

the

best Court of Appeals opinions

I

have

read,

the

circumstances of
case

& Oakes)

Friendly,

law,

and

this

case

concluded

and

the

that

the

I

relevant Supreme Court
program

violated

the
~

\

Establishment Clause on the excessive entanglement prong of
the

test

established

by

(1971), and its progeny.

Lemon

v.

Kurtzman,

403

U.S.

602

CA2 observed that although (1) New

York City's program has been quite successful

in achieving

its goal of aiding educationally disadvantaged children, and
(2)

the

record

.

revealed

little

actual

evidence

that

the

teachers had been unable to remain religiously neutral, the
program

violated

the

Clause

the

continuing

surveillance required to be sure that Title I

teachers did

not

advance

or

inhibit

religion

different"
Pittenger,

this
421

entanglement.
actual

because

u.s.
The

misconduct

349
court

by

(1975)'
found

Title

I

was

"not

<------------

Court
would
the

held
lead

lack

teachers

significantly

in

in
to

of
the

Meek

v.

excessive

evidence
past

of

to be

irrelevant to the serious potential for such problems posed
L~

4-

by the structure of the program •

• ,.t....._..'.;

(2)
taxpayers

Ball:

sued

In

GRDS,

August

the

State

1980,
Board

six

of

individual

Education,

and

others in DC, challenging the provision of Shared Time and
Community

Education

services

on

premises

leased

from

religiously-oriented nonpublic schools in the Grand Rapids
community.

A group of parents with children in the programs

intervened,

and an

8-day trial was conducted before Judge

Gibson in May 1982.

At the close of the case, but before

rendering a decision, Judge Gibson recused himself; the case
was reassigned to Judge Enslen, who decided the case based
on
He

the documentary evidence and
ruled

that

most

Establishment Clause.

of

the

transcripts of
programs

testimony.

violated

the

(The Drownproofing, Outdoor Education,

and Driver's Education programs were sustained.)
CA6
Krupansky

dissented

improperly

religious

on

ignored

cperational
because

(Edwards

the

history"

the

record

prohibition

the

Lively)

the

ground

"successful

of

the

of

majority • s
of

secular

affirmed.
that

and

programs,

demonstrates

indoctrination

rrograms,

and

no

students
rule

the

fully

amounts

instruction

majority
documented

concluding

attempted
by

Judge

or

teachers
to
at

a

that
actual

in

the

per

se

sectarian

mstitutions, a result she does not find compelled either by
the First Amendment or by the case law.

7.

c.

Relevant Case Law
There

involving

---

are

the

several

validity

cases

under

decided

the

by

this

Establishment

Clause of

state aid to primarily religious nonpublic schools.
summary

of

the

most

relevant

of

these

Court

follows,

A brief
as

their

reasoning will be central to decision of the cases at bar.
In

/Lemon

v.

Kurtzman,

u.s.

403

602.

the

(1971),

Court crystallized the now well-known three-part test that
------------~

has been commonly used to analyse cases arising under the
Establishment

Clause;

all

parties

in

these

two

cases

apparently agree that the test should be applied here.
test is

that

(i)

the statute at issue must have a secular

legislative purpose;
be

one

(iii)

that

neither

(ii)

the statute's primary effect must

advances

nor

inhibits

the statute must not foster
~

entanglement" with religion.
whether

an

look

(i)

at

excessive

institution;
(iii)

That

the
(ii)

and

"an excessive government
at 612-613.

entanglement

character

religion;

exists,

and purposes of

To determine

the

Court must

the benefitted

the nature of the State aid provided; and

the resulting relationship between the government and

the religious authority.
Lemon

also made

some

general

observations

the Establishment Clause and its purposes.
the

language

of

the

Clause

forbids

laws

about

Observing that
"respecting"

an

establishment of religion, the Court ruled that a law may be
invalid that falls short of actually establishing religion,
if

it

is a

"step that could

lead

to such establishment."

o.

Id.,

at

613.

The classic warning

in Establishment Clause

cases has been against "'programs, whose very nature is <.!E.i_
to

the

entangle

~

administration.'"

~parate

!d.,

615

(quoting

v.

involved

authorizing

schools

details

[religious]

of

Justice

Tax Commission,

397

Harlan's

u.s.

664,

(emphasis added)).
Lemon

statutes

at

~alz

opinion in

695 (1970)

in

state

in

the

Rhode

state

form

of

Island

and

Pennsylvania

subsidization

supplements

to

of

the

religious
salaries

of

religious school teachers who taught secular subjects, and
provision of

textbooks

The Court noted
success

and

other

instructional materials.

that the merits of the programs and their

in achieving

the goals of improved education were

not the issue; whether the programs were consistent with the
First Amendment

was

the

only

Id. ,

important concern.

at

625.
The

Court

______. violated

salaries

ruled
the

that

supplementing

Establishment

teacher

---------------~

The

Clause.

Court

reached this result even though teachers had testified that
they

had

not

injected

religion

into

the

secular

subjects

they taught.

The Court noted that it need not assume that

the

had

teachers

design

to

evade

accommodate

the

been
the

guilty

statutory

Establishment

of

required

salary

to

be

supplements

certain
are

not

faith

limitations
Clause;

allowing religion to creep in was
are

bad

that

the

or

conscious

implemented

to

potential

for

just too great.
the

teachers

inculcating

States
receiving

religion,

and

9.

teachers

are

not

susceptible,

like

books,

of

a

one-time

inspection to be sure of their ideological character.
teachers

at

issue

in

this

case

were

religious

(The
school

-

teachers, many of them nuns, although the Act required that
the teacher agree to teach only secular subjects and not to
teach

any

salary

religious

subjects as

supplements.)

"comprehensive,
surveillance

The

long

Court

discriminating,

[would]

as

received

and

the

that

considered
continuing

a

state

inevitably be required" to ensure that

the statutory restrictions were obeyed.
surveillance

she

would

lead

to

an

Id., at 619.

excessive

Such

government

entanglement with the religious schools.
finally,
~ograms

Lemon also considered that approving the

would be likely to result in the sort of political

divisiveness along religious lines that the Framers intended
the First Amendment

to prevent.

Local elections would be

permeated by the important issue of state aid to religious
schools, and votes would be cast along religious lines.
situation would
annual

aggravated

appropriations

p:>pulations grow.
In
~

be

and

by

larger

the

need

demands

The

for

continuing

as

costs

and

Id., at 622-623.

Committee

for

v. Nyquist, 413

u.s.

Public

Education

& Religious

756 (1973), the Court concluded

tha~ublic grants to nonpublic, primarily religious schools
for maintenance and repair required to
and

safety,

and

tuition

reimbursement

ens ~ tudent

and

tax

health

deductions

offered to parents of children in the nonpublic schools were

...•

invalid

because

religion.
Cburt
Your

In

they

the

opinion noted
or

~paration

a

analyising

reaffirmed

p:>ssible

had

primary

the

case,

three-part
that

effect
your

test

to

enforce

advancing

opinion

discussed

it has never

desirable

of

for

in

the

Lemon.

been thought either
a

regime

of

total

between Church and State, id., at 760; some forms

of aid may be channeled to the secular function of religious
schools

without

providing

prohibited

direct

rectarian, but "the channel is a narrow one,"
The

Court

concluded

that

provisions of the law were
advancing

religion,

the

aid

to

the

id., at 775.

maintenance

and

repair

invalid as having an effect of

because

the

law

did

not

limit

the

provision of funds to portions of the facilities that were
used

for

secular

statistical
state

purposes.

judgment will

funds

will

not

The Court noted

that

"a mere

not

suffice as a guarantee that

be

used

to

finance

religious

education"; after Lemon, the State must be certain that the
funds will not be so used.
As

deductions,

to

the

Id., at 778-779.

tuition

reimbursements

and

tax

the Court noted that the fact that the aid was

given to the parents and not directly to the school was not
mspositive, but was only one factor to be considered.
at 781.

It also observed that although the purposes of the

program

were

weighed

in

cherished

First Amendment values.

the

Id.,

Court

admirable,
determining

considered

this

was

only

whether

the

the

Id.,

one

factor

program
at

potential

795.
for

to

be

violated
Finally,
political

11.

K -----------

· di ~ ls~e,

as did the Lemon Court.

The pressure for enlargement of the program was predictable
and

would

religious

lead

to

the

type

of

over

!d., at 795-797.
Wheeler v. Barrera, 417

scope

~ogram

strife

was intended to

issues

prevent.

the

political

of

a

State's

duty

u.s.

402 (1974), involved

under

the

federal

Title

I

(at issue in Aguilar, at bar) to provide services to

nonpublic
public

school
school

expressly

left

children
children

open

comparable
under

the

the

validity

to

those

provided

The

decision

Act.

under

the

Establishment

Clause of Title I aid provided on the premises of religious
schools.
have

Your concurrence stated, however, that you "would

serious

statute

that

teachers

in

428.

misgivings
required

about
the

the

constitutionality of a

utilization

sectarian

of

public

[Nyquist.]"

school
Id. ,

at

Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that any aid

to religious schools--direct or indirect--violated the First
Amendment.
program,
laudable

He admonished that in failing to invalidate the

the

Court

purpose

deprived children.
Meek v.

had
of

been

improperly

Title

I

of

"seduced"

helping

considered

the

educationally

Id., at 429-430.
Pittenger,

421

u.s.

349

(1975), provides

the closest factual analogy to the cases at bar.
Court

by

Pennsylvania

laws

There, the

authorizing

loans

of

textbooks and
and

p

viding

"auxiliary

services"

including

counseling,

lZ.

therapy,

and

gifted

supplemental

students

to

instruction

students

on

for

the

remedial

religious

and

school

The

loans

of

instructional materials were invalidated because

unlik~

the

by

premises,

loan

of

public

textbooks,

rrater ials

were

school

which

lent

was

to the

religious

employees.

upheld,

schools,

The

schools'

and

secular

were

inextricably inter twined,

the

not

instructional

to

the

students.

educational

functions

and the loans therefore had

the primary effect of advancing religion.
The Court ·ruled
invalid

because

they

that the auxiliary services were

potentially

) I

entanglement

and

political

that

had

erred

the

DC

professionalism"
counselors

to

maintained.
~at

of

would

divisiveness.~·

in relying on

the

ensure

that

a

The

the

auxiliary

Id., at 369.

foster

excessive

--

Court

"good

staff

faith and

teachers

nonideological

--

held

posture

and
was

The Court believed that the fact

the teachers and counselors were public employees did

not

"substantially

surveillance" noted
s:hool

teachers.

visiting

were

eliminate

the

need

for

continuing

in Lemon, which had involved religious
Id.,

at

dedicated

to

371.

The

religious,

schools
as

well

they
as

were

secular

education, and the atmosphere of advancement of religion was
constantly
necessary

maintained.
to

ensure

that

The
the

"prophylactic
auxiliary

staff

contacts"
played

a

nonideolog ical role would lead to an intolerable degree of
entanglement, because under Lemon, the State must be certain
that impermissible conduct does not occur.

Therefore, the

·.

13.

fact that the danger of such conduct is less in a remedial
math

class

than

diminished

in

probability

sufficient."

of

history

does

not

impermissible

matter;

conduct

upheld

~ecifically

is

not

v.

various

Walter,

u.s.

433

provisions

of

229

(1977),

the

Ohio

to conform to Meek, which

law,

drafted

authorized loans of

instructional materials and textbooks, provision of
in

which

"a

Id.

In <alman
Court

medieval

nonpublic

school

personnel

were

not

testi~

involved,

provision of diagnostic services by employees of the public
school

system

services.

on

nonpublic

school

premises,

and

other

The diagnostic services were distinguished from

the teachers and counselors in Meek on the ground that such
services

have

diagnostician
tested,

and

little

has
the

only

or

no

limited

nature of

the

educational
contact

with

content,
the

the

children

relationship does not lend

itself to the transmission of sectarian views.

You wrote a ~

separate opinion concurring in · part and dissenting in part ~ .
in which you agreed that the diagnostic services should be
upheld.
itself

You noted that this area of the law does not lend
to

"analytical

Cburt's decisions must

tidiness,"

and

that

many

seem arbitrary.

Id.,

at

of

262.

the
You

found merit in the "persistent desire of a number of States
to

find

proper

means

of

helping

sectarian

education

to

survive," and noted the benefit that parochial schools have
provided.

Id.

You considered it important to note that the

risk of religious control over the democratic process was no

"''.

longer as significant as it was in the days of the Framers,
and you viewed
religious

the

lines"

risk of

to

be

"deep political division along

"remote."

Id.,

at

263.

Any such

risk seemed tolerable to you, given the benefit of sectarian
schools and the continuing oversight of the Court.

Id.

II. Discussion

The question of secular purpose is not at issue in
either

case--all

parties

in

both

cases

agree

that

programs at issue had a legitimate secular purpose.

the

There

is dispute in both cases about whether the programs have the
effect

of

advancing

cases, however,
enta~lement

on
are

gro!.lJ1dS.

primary

Both cases

religious

entanglement issue

in

involve

nature;

resulting

Court's prior decisions,
programs

in

in

both

schools

that

therefore,

the

relationship

government and the religious authority.

the

issue

turns largely on the nature of

the

and

the

is whether the programs can be invalidated

primarily

provided

religion;

both

are

between

the

I believe that this

discussed above,

cases

the aid

invalid

demonstrate that
on

entanglement

----------------------~
grounds, and consequently, I devote
most of my discussion to

----...,

that issue.

A. Aguilar
I
in

this

agree completely with Judge Friendly's opinion
case

invalidating

the

Title

I

program

on

·.

entanglement grounds.

If Lemon, Nyquist, and Meek are still

1

good law--and I have no reason to believe they are not--they
compel the conclusion that the Title I program at issue here
is unconstitutional.

Appellants and the SG make much of the

fact that Meek was decided on a meager factual record, while
fue program at issue here had been in operation for 16 years
and the extensive trial court record showed no evidence of
improper behavior by the Title I
~mon,

teachers.

Under Meek and

however, these facts are unimportant.

Although Meek

may have been decided on a meager record, I find nothing in
Justice
that

Stewart • s

case.

opinion

Rather,

it

that

held

so

limits

flatly

that

the
a

decision

court

is

in
not

entitled to rely on the "good faith and professionalism" of
the

teachers

involved

school

employees

reachers, as in Lemon.
fuat

the

DC

entanglement

be

sure

that

no

impermissible

This was so even though the teachers were

conduct occurs.
public

to

had

rather

Moreover,

made

issue,

403

than

at

school

the Lemon decision noted

"extensive
U.s.,

religious

findings"

615,

and

some

the

on

teachers

there had testified that they did not inject religion into
their

Nonetheless,

courses.

the Court

held

that

it

need

not, and did not, assume that the teachers had been unable
to remain neutral;
to do

so was

First

Amendment

the potential that they would be unable

present,

conduct occur red.

to

and

be

Thus,

the

State was

"certain"
although

that

required
no

by

the

impermissible

the lack of evidence

in

the record here of actual misconduct presents an emotionally

··' ,....
;,,

•·
'7

16.

appealing
under

case

the

judgment

not

decisions

~,

enough.

for

of

this

the

Court,

not

suffice"};

probability

of

Title

that

Nyquist, supra, at 778

will

diminished

invalidating

is

I

program,

not

nearly

("a mere statistical

Meek,

supra,

impermissible

at

371

("a

is

not

conduct

sufficient"}.
The

SG's

argument

centers

around

effective and beneficial program Title I
ineffective

alternatives

--------

have

proved

to

assertion and

acknowledged

rightly stated

that

a

highly

has been, and how

on-site

CA2

be.

what

the

it was

instruction

truth

of

this

the overwhelming

merit of the program that made this such a hard case.
merits

of

the

particular

program at

issue,

however,

never been deemed to be dispositive factors
~,

its First Amendment validity.

issue

before us,"

b:!en

although

enormous"}.

(admirable

purposes

considered) .

In

of

your

the

See

schools'

also

program

supra,

at

625

• • are not the

"contribution has

Nyquist,
only

have

in determining

Lemon,

(the "merit and benefits of these schools .

The

one

supra,
factor

at
to

se~on in~

795
be

you

expressed the need to accommodate the government's laudable
desire to aid nonpublic schools and what you viewed as the
decreased
oonetheless,

risk

of

the aid

political

divisiveness

these

in Wolman was substantially different

from the aid provided by New York's Title I program.
diagnosticians

days;

The

in Wolman were distinguished from teachers,

which are involved in this case, on the ground of lessened

..

contact

with

children,

contact

in

a

context

unlikely

to

permit transmission of religious values, and a relationship
much different from that of the one shared by teacher and
mildren.

None of those distinctions are applicable here.
The

the

SG argues

program--of

rooms

hiring

devoid

of

that

the

public

safeguards undertaken in

school

religious

teachers,

artifacts,

of

the

using

lack

of

reimbursement for use of the classroom space, supervision by
field supervisors and the Board of Education--all serve to
ensure that no religious
Title I

teachers.

instruction will be given by the

He also argues that the Title I program

is governed by detailed regulations that have the effect of
"routinizing" the relationship between the religious schools
and

the

Title

I

program,

thereby

minimizing

worry about excessive entanglement.

the

need

to

I do not find the SG's

arguments persuasive.
Meek

ruled

that

the

fact

that

the

teachers

involved there were public employees did not "substantially
eliminate the need for continuing surveillance" that existed
because the instruction was provided on the premises of the
religious
dedicated

schools.
to

the

421

u.s.,

advancement

at

of

371.

religion"

The

"atmosphere

that

the

Meek

Court found made continuing surveillance necessary seems to
ITE

to be

have

been

argue--and

no less present here
stripped
it

of

seems

just because certain rooms

religious
patently

artifacts.
true--that

Respondents
occasional

unannounced visits by supervisors cannot accurately prohibit

improper

religious

occurred.

inculcation

or

detect

whether

it

has

Moreover, the fact that the relationship between

the Title I program administrators and the religious schools
has

become

"routine"

surveillance:

does

if anything,

not

eliminate

the

need

for

it may have the effect of making

the need more apparent, as everyone will be less on guard to
prevent

improper

comfortable.
having

The

public

religious

conduct
short

school

schools

once

answer

is

teachers

presents

a

the

relationship

that

teach

Meek
on

potential

the
for

becomes

teaches

that

premises

of

impermissible

conduct that is more heightened than if the instruction took
place on a neutral site: it also held that the State must be
certain that no such conduct occurred, something that could
only be achieved by continuing surveillance.
no substantial difference

between

I can discern

this case and that one,

and I would therefore recommend that you vote to affirm.
The only way
change your

-

joined.

to reverse,

view from that of

Your

it seems

to me,

is to

the Meek opinion, which you

separate opinion in Wolman could be read as

l eading toward that view, and certainly, in the abstract, it
~ems

a shame to invalidate what has been a very important

and worthwhile program in New York City.
York

City,

really

an

sending

one's

alternative

p..Iblic schools are

child

to

public

in many areas,

just not safe.)

(Indeed,
school

in New
is

not

because many of the

On the other hand, as

noted above, the programs upheld in Wolman are substantially

different

from

the

program

involved

On

here.

balance,

I

believe the case should be affirmed.

B. Ball
For
above,

much

the

same

reasons

as

those

discussed

I believe this case should be affirmed, as well.

As

in Aguilar, appellants stress the fact that the programs at
issue

have

been

in

extensive

factual

evidence

that

record

potential

for

Lemon

in

time,

and

DC

showed

the

the
no

supplemental

the

and

Meek

does

conduct,

evidence

such

long

providing

however,

that

conclusion

a

As

but neutral as to religion.

anything

above,

for

developed

teachers

instruction were
discussed

operation

impermissible

lead

to

the

not

diminish

the

and

that

it

is

therefore not dispositive.
If
greater

anything,

potential

.Aguilar.

Instead

the

for
of

facts

of

improper
public

this

conduct

school

case

than

teachers

present

a

those

in

do

consistently

being used, many of the teachers involved in the Shared Time
program, and almost all of those involved in the Community
Education program,

are

religious

school

teachers who have

been hired by the public school to implement the programs.
Moreover,
~hools

believe

the

religious

that

the
because

Grand
of

government entanglement.

.

are

paid

to lease the classroom space used.

invalidated

~

schools

Rapids
the

programs

potential

by

the

private

Under Meek,
must
for

also

I
be

excessive

c.

Effect of Advancing Religion
Appellants in both cases emphasize the facts that

the

instruction offered is supplementary,

that the courses

are not required by the religious schools as a condition of
graduation,

and

that

the

programs

were

students, not to the nonpublic schools.

offered

to

the

The argument that

the courses were offered to the students is a transparent,
but unsuccessful attempt to fit within Meek.

The religious

schools were required to authorize provision of the courses
in any particular

school,

students

would

~ception

of the Community Education leisure time courses).

Mbreover,
~rvices

in

receive

and those schools decided which

Meek,

the

the

instruction

DC

had

held

{with

that

the possible

the

auxiliary

were provided to the children, not to the schools:

yet the Court invalidated provision of the services.
That the courses were supplementary and were not
required

for

schools

were

respect

to

graduation does
not
the

being

not mean

advanced

remedial

that

thereby:

instruction,

the

the

religious

especially with
public

programs

were fulfilling a function that was evidently needed in the
religious schools.
public

aid

By providing

relieved

the

schools

it to those schools,
of

an

obligation

the
they

otherwise would have had if they were going to educate their
students

properly.

programs

at

issue

Therefore,

it

here advanced

aiding the religious schools.

appears

to me

that

the

religion by substantially

Conclusion

This
involving
public

Court

the

aid

has

validity

to

decided

under

nonpublic

a

the

long

line

of

Establishment

religious

schools.

cases

Clause of
Under

the

teachings of these cases, sending public school teachers to
~ach

on the premises of religious schools has always been

viewed as presenting the potential for improper inculcation
~

of

religion

by

~

require
amount

the

continuing
to

that

there

prevention

surveillance

excessive

administration of
fact

teachers,

government

the
has

of

a

no

which

would

that

would

degree

entanglement

evidence

with

In my view,

religious schools.
been

of

of

past

the
the

improper

conduct by such teachers involved in these programs does not
lessen the potential

for

it occurring

cases have all held that
the

fact

of

improper

in the future.

The

the potential is as important as

conduct,

for

purposes

of

protecting

First Amendment values, and the potential exists because of
the

structure of

instruction
schools.

to

be

these programs which requires the public
provided

on

the

premises

of

religious

Consequently, surveillance leading to entanglement

would still be required in these cases to be "certain" that
no

impermissible

therefore
the

invalid

conduct
under

occurs,

and

this Court's
I

Establishment Clause.

the

programs

longstanding

therefore recommend

are

view of
that you

vote to affirm in both cases.

~.

,,

No. 83-990, School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, et al.
Memorandum to File
This is a summary memorandum based on a preliminary review
of the opinion of CA 6 and the briefs of the parties.
The Facts and the Issue
This case involves Michigan law - in effect in one form
or another for 60 years - that authorizes public school
districts to assist in meeting the educational needs of all
students, including both public and nonpublic school students.
The programs at issue here are known as the Shared Time and
Community Education courses.

With one exception, only the

operation of these programs at the elementary level is involved
in this case.

The summary of the facts set forth below are

those found by the DC and accepted by CA 6 after a review of
the record.
The facts present an Establishment Clause issue.

The

plaintiffs (respondents here) are Michigan taxpayers and
Americans United.

The original defendants were the school

district for the City of Grand Rapids and certain public education officials.

Some parents of children who benefited from the

programs intervened.

The two programs mentioned above, specif-

ically authorized in 1978, have grown from some 9,000 nonpublic
school students enrolled at a cost to the State of $1,397,000.
to more than 11,000 students at a cost of

~he

State aid to

No. 83-990

almost $6,000,000.

2.

Both programs operate under a standard

form lease provided by the state.

The lease, at nominal rentals,

entitles the public schools to conduct these programs in the
buildings of nonpublic schools (I will refer to the latter
as "religious schools").

The leases do not restrict public school

employees from using any of the facilities, though in practice
specific classrooms are designated.

All religious symbols

are removed from the classrooms and - I believe from other
areas used such as libraries.

Signs are posted designating the

particular class areas as "public school classrooms".

The two

programs, at the time of this case, employed 470 full and part-time
teachers, a number of whom had taught in the religious schools
previously - some in the same schools where these state sponsored
classes were given.
Shared Time is a program that offers substantive courses to
religious school pupils during regular school hours.

Courses

included mathematics, reading, physical education and art.

During

the academic year 1981-82, 41 religious schools participated in the
Grand Rapids Shared Time program.

With the exception of physical

education, industrial art, music and art, the educational opportunities offered through the program are supplementary to the
core curriculum of religious schools.

Apparently in some years

courses in the humanities, Spanish, French, Latin, calculus, etc.,
have been offered.

(It is not clear to me whether these quite

substantive courses were offered during the period at issue in
this case) .

No. 83-990

3.

There was testimony that 10 percent of the religious students'
time during the academic year consisted of Shared Time instruction.
The Community Education program differs primarily from Shared
Time in that its classes are scheduled outside of the regular school
hours.

Courses included typing, business machines, computers,

photography, retailing, bookkeeping, etc.

These are voluntary

courses, and a course is offered only if as many as 12 students
sign up for it.

A majority of the Community Education instructors

are employed full time either by the religious school or the public
school.

My understanding is that Community Education instruction

was offered after hours - and sometimes before opening - in both
public and religious schools.

Some 40 of the Grand Rapids' non-

public schools have participated in these programs.

Most are

Catholic, but a number are schools of other religious faiths.

The Question Presented
"Whether it constitutes a per se violation of the
Establishment Clause for a local school district,
as part of an enrichment and remedial educational
program made available to all children in the district, to provide - under public school control secular, supplementary, nonsubstitutionary courses
of instruction to private school students on premises
leased from religiously-oriented nonpublic schools."

No. 83-990

4.

Brief Discussion
The opinions of the parties below address this case fully,
and CA 6 affirmed the decision of the DC - with one judge dissenting.

The United States - actually the Department of Labor -

is one of the respondents because Federal legislation provides for
grants-in-aid to local educational agencies serving areas with
concentrations of children from low-income families.

See Title I

of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.

The Act

specifically requires that provisions be made for the participation of eligible students who attend nonpublic schools.
however, does not involve a challenge to the Federal Act.

This case,
It

arises under Michigan law, but the SG argues that our decision
will affect Federal law.
The courts below and the parties debate the proper application
of the several Establishment Clause cases decided by this Court.
The primary focus - at least of the courts below - was on the
three part test of Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,
413

u.s.

756 (1973).

Unless the state program meets each of these

tests, it has been held to violate the Establishment Clause.
tests are:

.

'

The

No. 83-990

(i)
(ii)

5.

The statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
Its principle or primary effect must neither advance nor
inhibit religion (see Board of Education v. Allen, 392
U.S. 2 36, 2 4 3) ; and

(iii)

The statute must not foster "an excessive Government
intanglement with religion."
397

u.s.

See Waltz v. Tax Commission,

674.

The DC agreed that the purpose of these programs clearly was
"secular", and was not intended by the legislature to advance
religion.

The findings of the DC as to "secular" were found not

to be clearly erroneous, and the facts were "affirmed".

With

respect to the second and third tests, "advances or inhibits
religion" and "excessively intangles Government with religion",
CA 6 found it "impossible completely to separate" the two in this
case, and accordingly reviewed carefully the DC's findings with
respect to each of them.

CA 6 found the following factual con-

clusions to be correct:
"The significant features which distinguish this
present case from cases wherein the Supreme Court
has not found violation of the establishment clause
are these:

First, this program is primarily a

program of assistance to elementary schools; [l]
second, this program is one which gives substantial
financial aid to education in parochial school
buildings; [ 2 ] third, the parochial schools

No. 83-990

6.

concerned have religious indoctrination as
3
a primary school purpose; [ ] fourth, the
impact upon taxpayers and the parochial
4
schools is direct. [ ]"

The Court of Appeals found the intanglement to be
particularly serious, and concluded that these programs
"clearly give direct aid to parochial schools in
parochial school buildings.

By doing so, they also assist

those schools in performing their religious missions, in
violation of the First Amendment."

Pet. 40a

Indeed, CA 6, despite a strong dissent, concluded that
the continuation of these programs could "end public
education as a major aspect of the American goal of equality
of opportunity".

It cited also my concurring opinion in

Wheeler v. Barrera, 417

u.s.

402 at 419.

I said that

"I would have serious misgivings about the constitutionality
of a statute that required the utilization of public school
teachers in sectarian schools."
The SG, in particular, argues strongly that these
programs do not violate the Establishment Clause.

They are

said to be programs that "meet all of the requirements of the
three part test."

Relying on Mueller v . Allen (decided

June 29, 1983), the SG thinks these "states have a legitimate
interest in helping to improve the secular education of

No. 83-990
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students attending nonpublic schools".

The SG also properly

emphasizes that these particular programs serve the purpose
of "enriching'' the educational program for the benefit of all
children.

They are characterized as being "secular, supplementary,

nonsubstitutional courses of instruction".

* * *
These Establishment Clause cases are particularly difficult
for me.

Having been in public school education for 19 years

in Virginia, I would hesitate to uphold state law that weakened
the public school systems in any significant way.

On the other

hand, as I have said - I believe last Term and earlier - the
private schools, including the church schools, are an important
part of the American educational system.

In some states they

are essential - New York for example - where the population has
major religious components.

Moreover, on balance, the religious

schools lessen the tax burden for the states, and they also
provide competition that often is wholesome.
Our cases generally - despite a good deal of weaving back and
forth based on a variety of different types of aid - have
recognized the importance of separation of church and state in
our country.

This is an importance rooted in the religious

persecution suffered by many of the early settlers in this
country.

The history of religious faiths - as evidenced, for
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example, by what is happening today in Iran, India, and perhaps
other countries - makes clear that a religious influence in a
country is not necessarily beneficial.

Human rights often

have been sacrificed on the "altar of religion".

The founding

fathers therefore were wise to provide for strict separation.
Despite these views, I try to decide these cases on the
basis of our prior authorities.

I therefore need a careful

bench memo addressing this question.
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JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The School District of Grand Rapids, Michigan, adopted
P0v ~
two programs in which classes for nonpublic school students
J• ~ ' '
are financed by the public school system, taught by teachers
~ _ 2 D
hired by the public school system, and conducted in "leased"
classrooms in the nonpublic schools. Most of the nonpublic
~/- -?-eschools involved in the programs are sectarian religious
schools. This case raises the question whether these pro~'t~f- q.-, grams impermissibly involve the government in the support
~ ~~ ·
of sectarian religious activities and thus violate the Establish~ &
~ . ment Clause of the First Amendment.

i<.J~- LO

I

--:-~ ~ ~.a-r.- h9A ~..J

~ . p'-tr
(.

~...c.-JL- \
- - - , ' -- J

2.-o
At issue in this case are the Community Education and
Shared Time programs offered in the nonpublic schools of
Grand Rapids, Michigan. These programs, first instituted
in the 1976-1977 school year, provide classes to nonpublic
school students at public expense in classrooms located in and
leased from the local nonpu~lic schools.
Thershared Time program offers classes during the regular
school di y that are intended to be supplementary to the "core
curriculum" courses that the State of Michigan requires as a
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part of an accredited school program. Among the subjects
offered are "remedial" and "enrichment" mathematics, "remedial" and "enrichment" reading, art, music, and physical
education. A typical nonpublic school student attends these
classes for one or two class periods per week; approximately
"ten percent of any given nonpublic school student's time
quring the academic year would consist of Shared Time instruction." · 546 F. Supp. 1071, 1079 (W. D. Mich. 1982).
Although S~elf is a program offered only in ..t}le
no~b~ s~hoo~, there was testimony that the courses include<ITn £liafj)rogram are offered, albeit perhaps in a somewhat different form, in the public schools as well. All of the
classes that are the subject of this case are taught in elementary schools, with the exception of Math Topics, a remedial
math course taught in the secondary schools. 1
The Shared Time teachers are full-time employees of the
public schools, who often move fro:riiClaSsroom to classroom
during the course of the school day. A "significant portion"
of the teachers (approximately 10%) "previously taught in
nonpublic schools, and many of these had been assigned to
the same nonpublic school where they were previously employed." I d., at 1078. The School District of Grand Rapids
hires Shared Time teachers in accordance with its ordinary
hiring procedures. Ibid. The public school system apparently provides all of the supplies, materials, and equipment

--

1

Shared Time and Community Education courses are taught at the elementary and secondary level in nonpublic schools. However, after the
District Court found for respondents and enjoined the further operation of
the programs, petitioners did not appeal the decision to the extent that it
involved "physical education and industrial arts shared time classes at the
secondary level and community education classes at the secondary level."
App. 39. Thus, the appeal involved only Shared Time classes at the elementary level, Community Education classes at the elementary level, and
the remedial math Shared Time class at the secondary level. 718 F. 2d, at
1390. These are the only programs whose constitutionality is now before
the Court.
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used in connection with Shared Time instruction.
341.

1

3

See App.

I

T
ommunity Education Pro
offered throughout
ap"ds mmunity in schools and on other sites,
the Gran
for children as well as adults. The classes at issue here are
taught in the nonpublic elementary schools and commence at
the conclusion of there lar school day. Among the courses
offeTeerare · rts and Crafts, Home Economics, Spanish,
Gymnastics, Yearbook Production, Christmas Arts and
Crafts, Drama, Newspaper, Humanities, Chess, Model
Building, and Nature Appreciation. The IJlstrict Court
found that "[a]lth~unity Education courses
offered at nonpublic school sites are not offered at the public
schools on a Community Education basis, all Community
Education programs are otherwise available at the public
schools, usually as a part of their more extensive regular
'-'
curriculum." 546 F. Supp., at 1079.
Community Education teachers are'P.art-time public school
-~e.
e~.
Community Education courses are completely
v~ary and are offer~ only_if twel~e or more stude~n
roll. lfecause a well-known teacher 1s necessary to attract
£he requisite number of students, the School District accords
a preference in hiring to instructors already teaching within
the school. Thus, "virtually every Community Education
course conducted on facilities leased from nonpublic schools
has an instructor otherwise employed'~ tim~' by the same
nor}pUblic sc ool." 546 . upp., at 7 .
~s are administered similarly. The Director
of ~am, a public school employee, sends packets of
course listings to the participating nonpublic schools before
the school year begins. The nonpublic school administrators
then decide which courses they want to offer. The Director
works out an academic schedule for each school, taking into
account inter alia the varying religious holidays celebrated
by the schools of different denominations.

7
?

7
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Nonpublic school administrators decide which classrooms
will be used for the programs, and the Director then inspects
the facilities and consults with Shared Time teachers to make
sure the facilities are satisfactory. The public school system
pays the nonpublic schools for the use of the necessary classroom space by entering into "leases" at the rate of $6 per
classroom per week. The "leases," however, contain no
mention of the particular room, space, or facility leased and
teachers' rooms, libraries, lavatories, and similar facilities
are made available at no additional charge. Id., at 1077.
Each room used in the programs has to be free of any crucifix, religious symbol, or artifact, although such religious symbols can be present in the adjoining hallways, corridors, and
other facilities used in connection with the program. During
the time that a given classroom is being used in the programs, the teacher is required to post a sign stating that it is
a "public school classroom." 2 However, there are no signs
posted outside the school buildings indicating that public
school courses are conducted inside or that the facilities are
being used as a public school annex.
Although petitioners label the Shared Time and Community Education students as "part time public school students," the students attending Shared Time and Community
Education courses in facilities leased from a nonpublic school
are the same students who attend that particular school otherwise. I d., at 1078. There is no evi.9._ence that any public
school stude t has ever attended a Shared Time or Commuruty Education class in a on ublic school. I d., at 1 97.
The District Court found that "[t]hough efendants claim the
Shared Time program is available to all students, the record
is abundantly clear that only nonpublic school students wear2
The signs read as follows: "Grand Rapids Public Schools' Room. This
room has been leased by the Grand Rapids Public School District, for the
purpose of conducting public school educational programs. The activity in
this room is controlled solely by the Grand Rapids Public School District."
App. 200.
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ing the cloak of a 'public school student' can enroll in it."
Ibid. The District Court noted that "[w]hereas public school
students are assembled at the public facility nearest to their
residence, students in religious schools are assembled on the
basis of religion without any consideration of residence or
school district boundaries." Id., at 1093. Thus, "beneficiaries are wholly designated on the basis of religion," ibid. , and
these "public school" classes, in contrast to ordinary public
school classes which are largely neighborhood-based, are as
segregated by religion as are the schools at which they are
offered. 3
Forty of the forty-one schools at which the programs operate~er.4 The schools of course vary
from one another, but substantial evidence suggests that
they share deep religious urposes. For instance, the Parent Han oo o one atholic school states the goals of Catholic education as "[a] God oriented environment which permeates the total educational program," "[a] Christian
atmosphere which guides and encourages participation in the
church's commitment to social justice," and "[a] continuous
development of knowledge of the Catholic faith, its traditions, teachings and theology." I d., at 1080. A policy statement of the Christian schools similarly proclaims that "it is
not sufficient that the teachings of Christianity be a separate
subject in the curriculum, but the Word of God must be an
all-pervading force in the educational program." I d., at
1081. These Christian schools require all parents seeking to
enroll their children either to subscribe to a particular doctrinal statement or to agree to have their children taught ac3

As would be expected, a large majority of the students attending religious schools belong to the denomination that controls the school. The
District Court found, for instance, that approximately 85 percent of the
students at the Catholic schools are Catholic. 546 F. Supp., at 1080.
• Twenty-eight of the schools are Roman Catholic, seven are Christian
Reformed, three are Lutheran, one is Seventh Day Adventist, and one is
Baptist.
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cording to the doctrinal statement. The District Court
found that the schools are "pervasively sectarian," id., at
1096 n. 13, and concluded "without 1iesltationthat the purposes of these schools is to advance their particular religions," id., at 1096, and that "a substantial portion of their
functions are subsumed in the religious mission." I d., at
1084.
B
Re~on~ts are si,?c taxpa~s who filed suit against the
School District of Grand Rapids and a number of state officials. They charged that the Shared Time and Community
Education programs violated the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment of the Constitution, made applicable to
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947). After an 8-day
bench trial, the District Court entered a judgment on the
merrrs-on-behalf of respondents and enjoined further operation of the program. 5
Applying the familiar three-part purpose, effect, and entanglement test set out inlemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602
(1971), the court held that, although the ~ose of the programs was secular, their e~t was "distinctly impermissible." 546 F~pp., at 1093. The court relied in particular
5
Petitioners alleged that respondents lacked taxpayer standing under
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 (1968), and Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U. S. 464
(1982). The District Court and the Court of Appeals rejected the standing
challenge. We affirm this finding, relying on the numerous cases in which
we have adjudicated Establishment Clause challenges by state taxpayers
to programs for aiding nonpublic schools. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter,
433 U. S. 229 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Maryland, 426
U. S. 736, 744 (1976); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 355, n. 6 (1975);
Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Committee for Public Education v.
Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 762 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 735
(1973); Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, 413 U. S. 472, 478
(1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 608, 611 (1971); Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 3 (1947).
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on the fact that the programs at issue involved publicly provided instructional services that served nonpublic school students segregated largely by religion on nonpublic school
premises. The court also noted that the programs conferred
"direct benefits, both financial and otherwise, to the sectarian institutions." 546 F. Supp., at 1094. Finally, the court
found that the programs necessarily entailed an unacceptable
·1evel of entanglement, both political and administrative, between the public school systems and the sectarian schools.
Petitioners appealed the judgment of the District Court to
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Aiiaided~_nel
of the ~ed. 718 F. 2 1 89 (1983).
We granted certiorari, - - U.S. - - (1984), and now
affirm.

II
A

The First Amendment's guarantee that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion," as our
cases demonstrate, is more than a pledge that no single religion will be designated.;is a state religion. Committee for
Public Education v. vNyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 771 (1973);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 442 (1961). It is also more than a
mere injunction that governmental programs discriminating
among religions are unconstitutional. See, e. g., School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203,
216-217 (1963); McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S.
203, 211 (1948). The Establishment Clause instead primarily proscribes "sponsorship, firiaiiCial support, and ac.J;We involvement of the sovereign in religious activity." vNyquist,
supra, at 772; see also Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S.
664, 668 (1970). As Justice Black, writing for the Court in
Everson v. Board of Education, supra, at 15-16 (1947),
stated: "Neither [a state nor the Federal Government] can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
one religion over another. . . . No tax in any amount, large
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or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice religion."
Since Everson made clear that the guarantees of the
Establishment Clause apply to the States, we have often
grappled with the problem of state aid to non ublic, religious
schools.
n all of these cases, our goal has been to give
··~ng to the sparse language and broad purposes of the
Clause, while not unduly infringing on the ability of the
States to prov1 e or e we are o e1r eople in accordance
roviding for the ;·
with their own particular circumstances.
education of schoolchildren is surely a praiseworthy purpose.
But our cases have consistently recognized that even such a
praiseworthy, secular purpose cannot validate ~vernment
aid to parochial schools when the a1d lias tfie e?rect of r ot~ aSiiigle religion or religion generall 0
~un
~ ~s the government in matters religious.
For
just as religion throughout history has provided spiritual
comfort, guidance, and inspiration to many, it can also serve
powerfully to divide societies and to exclude those whose beliefs are not in accord with particular religions or sects that
have from time to time achieved dominance. The solution to
this problem adopted by the Framers and consistently recognized by this Court is jealously to guard the right of every
individual to worship according to the dictates of conscience
while re uirin the overnment to maintain a course of neutralit~ !!_mQ!!K_ religiQ!!_s, ~
etween re igiQn and nonreligion. Only in this way can we "make room for as wide a
variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of man
deem necessary" and "sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows no partiality to any one group and lets
each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 313
(1952).

We have noted that the three-part test first articulated in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S., at 612-613, guides "[t]he
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general nature of our inquiry in this area," Mueller v. Allen,
463 u.s. 783,- (1983):
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court
over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned
from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 243
(1968); finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive
government entanglement with religion.' Walz [v. Tax
Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970)]." Lemon v.
Kurtzman, supra, at 612-613.
These tests "must not be viewed as setting the precise limits
to the necesesary constitutional inquiry, but serve only as
guidelines with which to identify instances in which the objectives of the Establishment Clause have been impaired."
/ Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 359 (1975). We have particularly relied on Lemon in every case involving the sensitive relationship between government and religion in the
education of our children. The government's activities in
this area can have a magnified impact on impressionable
young minds, and the occasional rivalry of parallel public and
private school systems offers an all-too-ready opportunity for
divisive rifts along religious lines in the dy politic. See
Committee for Public Education
quis , supra, at 796798; Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 6 -624.
As has often been true in school aid cases, there is no dispute as to the first test. Both the District Court and the
Court of Appeals found that the PEPO..§.e of the Community
Education and Shared Time programs was "m~u
lar." 546 F. Supp., at 1085; see also 718 F. 2d, at 1398. We
fui'a no reason to disagree with this holding, and therefore go
on to consider whether the primary or principal effect of the
challenged programs is to advance or inhibit religion.
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B

Our inquiry must begin with a consideration of the nature
of the institutions in which the programs operate. Of the 41
private schools where these "part time public schools" have
operated, 40 are identifiably religious schools. It is true that
each school may not share all of the characteristics of religious schools as articulated, for example, in the complaint in
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 356 (1975); see also Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S., at 615. The District Court found, ,6 C ;:,however, that "[b]ased upon the massive testimony and ex- .IA~J~~""'
hibits, the conclusion is inescapable that the religious institu- r-~
tions receiving instructional services from the public schools
are sectarian in the sense that a substantial portion of their
functions are subsum~ in the religious mission." 546 F.
Supp., at 1096; see '1Iunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 735
(1973); Meek v. Pittenger, supra, at 364-365 ("[t]he very purpose of many of those schools is to provide an integrated secular and religious education); Walz v. Tax Commission, 397
U. S., at 671 ("to assure future adherents to a particular ·
faith" is "an affirmative if not dominant policy of church
schools"). At the religious schools here-as at the sectarian
schools that have been the subject of our past cases-"the
secular education those schools provide goes hand in hand
with the religious mission that is the only reason for the
schools' existence. Within that institution, the two are inextricably intertwined." 6 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S., at
The elementary and secondary schools in this case differ substantially
from the colleges that we refused to characterize as "pervasively sectarian" in Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426 U. S. 736,
755-759 (1976). See also Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1973); Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). Many of the schools in this case include
prayer and attendance at religious services as a part of their curriculum,
are run by churches or other organizations whose members must subscribe
to particular religious tenets, have faculties and student bodies composed
largely of adherents of the particular denomination, and give preference in
attendance to children belonging to the denomination. 546 F. Supp. , at
6

1080-1084.
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657 (Opinion of BRENNAN, J.). See also Meek v. Pittenger,
supra, at 365-366; Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S.
236, 245, 247-248 (1968).
Given that forty of the forty-one schools in this case are
thus "pervasively sectarian," the challenged public-school
programs operatin in the reli ·ous sc oo s may 1m ermissibl~ -~_!_i~n in three differenLFays.
Firs t e
teachers participating in the programs may become mvolved
in intentionally or inadvertently inculcating particular religious tenets or beliefs. ~' the programs may provide a
crucial symbolic link between government and religion,
thereby e nlistmg- at least in the eyes of impressionable
youngsters-the powers of government to th~ort of the
religious denomination operating the school. ~ ' the programs may have the effect of directly promotm_g religiog by
impermisSibly pr'oVi<Iifig a suf>sidy to the primary religious
mission o th ms 1 u 1on

(1)

~

Although Establishment Clause jurisprudence is characterized by few absolutes, th~use does absolute! rqhibit
Gov~men~financed or Government-sponsored indoctrinatiq_n into .t.he beliefs of a _particular religious faith. See Stone
v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U. S., at 370; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S.,
at 619 ("The State must be certain, given the Religion
Clauses, that subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion.");
Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, 413 U. S. 472, 480
(1973) ("[T]he State is constitutionally compelled to assure
that the state-supported activity is not being used for religious indoctrination"); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 429
(1962); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S., at 314 ("Government
may not finance religious groups nor undertake religious instruction nor blend secular and sectarian education . . .. ").
Such indoctrination, if permitted to occur, would have devastating effects on the right of each individual voluntarily to

~.

~

.a £~-4~,~
lA-C--~
~s
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detennine what to believe (and what not to believe) free of
any coercive pressures from the State, while at the same
time tainting the resulting religious beliefs with a corrosive
secularism.
In Meek v. Pittenger, supra, the Court invalidated a statute providing for the loan of state-paid professional staffincluding teachers-to nonpublic schools to provide remedial
and accelerated instruction, guidance counseling and testing,
and other services on the premises of the nonpublic schools.
Such a program, if not subjected to a "comprehensive,
discriminating, and continuing state surveillance," Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U. S., at 618-619 (quoted in Meek, supra, at
370), would entail an unacceptable risk that the the statesponsored instructional personnel would "advance the religious mission of the church-related schools in which they
serve." Meek, supra, at 370. Even though the teachers
were paid by the State, "[t]he potential for impermissible fostering of religion under these circumstances, although somewhat reduced, is nonetheless present." !d., at 372. The
program in Meek, if not sufficiently monitored, would simply
have entailed too great a risk of state-sponsored
indoctrination.
The programs before us today share the defect that we
identified lnM e~ With respec o t e ommunity Education ogram, the District Court found that "virtu~ry (
Communit Education course conducted on facilities leased
from nonpu ·c schools has an instructor otherwise emplo~d
fu.l!.-.ti!!1e y e same nonpu 1c school." 546 F. Supp., at
1079. These Tnstructors, many of Whom no doubt teach in
the religious schools precisely because they are adherents of
the controlling denomination and want to serve their religious community zealously, are expected during the regular
school day to inculcate their students with the tenets and beliefs of their particular religious faiths. Yet the premise of
the program is that those instructors can put aside their religious convictions and engage in entirely secular Community

•'

83-990--0PINION
GRAND RAPIDS SCHOOL DISTRICT v. BALL

13

Education instruction as soon as the school day is over.
Moreover, they are expected to do so before the same religious-school students and in the same religious-school classrooms that they employed to advance religious purposes during the "official" school day. Nonetheless, as petitioners
themselves asserted, Community Education classes are not
specifically monitored for religious content. App. 353.
We do not question that the dedicated and professional religious school teachers employed by the Community Education program will attempt in good faith to perform their secular mission conscientiously. Cf. Lemon, 403 U. S., at
618-619. Nonetheless, there is a substantial risk that,
overtly or subtly, the religious message they are expected to
convey during the regular school day will infuse the supposedly secular classes they teach after school. The danger
arises "not because the public employee [is] likely deliberately to subvert his task to the service of religion, but rather
because the pressures of the environment might alter his behavior from its normal course." Wolman v. Walter, 433
U. S. 229, 247 (1977). "The conflict of functions inheres in
the situation." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 617.
The Shared Time program, though structured somewhat (
differently, nonetheless also poses a substantial risk of statesponsored indoctrination. The most important difference
between the programs is that most of the instructors in the
Shared Time program are full-time teachers hired by the
public schools. Moreover, although "virtually every" Community Education instructor is a full-time religious school
teacher, 546 F. Supp., at 1079, only "[a] significant portion"
of the Shared Time instructors previously worked in the religious schools. 7 I d., at 1078. Nonetheless, as with the
Community Education program, no attempt is made to moniApproximately 10% of the Shared Time instructors were previously
employed by the religious schools, and many of these were reassigned back
to the school at which they had previously taught.
7

..
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tor the Shared Time courses for religious content. App.
330. 8
Thus, despite these differences between the two programs,
our holding in Meek controls the inquiry with respect to
Shared Time, as well as Community Education. Shared
Time instructors are teaching academic subjects in religious
l3chools in courses virtually indistinguishable from the other
courses offered during the regular religious-school day. The
teachers in this program, even more than their Community
Education colleagues, are "performing important educational
services in schools in which education is an integral part of
the dominant sectarian mission and in which an atmosphere
dedicated to the advancement of religious belief is constantly
maintained." Meek v. Pittenger, supra, at 371. Teachers
in such an atmosphere may well subtly (or overtly) conform
their instruction to the environment in which they teach,
while students will perceive the instruction provided in the
context of the dominantly religious message of the institution, thus reinforcing the indoctrinating effect. As we
stated in Meek, "[w]hether the subject is 'remedial reading,'
'advanced reading,' or simply 'reading,' a teacher remains a
teacher, and the danger that religious doctrine will become
intertwined with secular instruction persists." 421 U. S., at
370. Unlike types of aid that the Court has upheld, such as
state-created standardized tests, Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646 (1980), or diagnostic services,
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S., at 241-244, there is a "substantial risk" that programs operating in this environment
would "be used for religious educational purposes." Committeefor Public Education v. Regan, supra, at 656.
The Court of Appeals of course recognized that respondents adduced no evidence of specific incidents of religious
8
The public school system does include Shared Time teachers in its ordinary teacher evaluation program, which subjects them to evaluation once
each year during their first year of teaching and once every three years
after that. App. 54, 330.

.

'
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indoctrination in this case. 718 F. 2d, at 1404. But the
absence of proof of specific incidents is not dispositive.
When conducting a supposedly secular class in the pervasively sectarian environment of a religious school, a teacher
may knowingly or unwillingly tailor the content of the course
to fit the school's announced goals. If so, there is no reason
to believe that this kind of ideological influence would be de·tected or reported by students, by their parents, or by the
school system itself. The students are presumably attending religious schools precisely in order to receive religious instruction. After spending the balance of their school day in
classes heavily influenced by a religious perspective, they
would have little motivation or ability to discern improper
ideological content that may creep into a Shared Time or
Community Education course. Neither their parents nor
the parochial schools would have cause to complain if the effect of the publicly-supported instruction were to advance the
sectarian mission. And the public school system itself has no
incentive to detect or report any specific incidents of improper state-sponsored indoctrination. Thus, the lack of evidence of specific incidents of indoctrination is of little
significance.
(2)
Our cases have recognized that the Establishment Clause
guards against more than direct, state-funded efforts to indoctrinate youngsters in specific religious beliefs. Government promotes religion as effectively when it fosters a close
identification of its powers and responsibilities with those of
any-or all-religious denominations as when it attempts to
inculcate specific religious doctrines. If this identification
conveys a message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion, a core purpose of the Establishment
Clause is violated. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 103 S. Ct. 1355,
1366 (1984) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); cf. Abington School
District v. Schempp, 374 U. S., at 222 (history teaches that
"powerful sects or groups might bring about a fusion of gov-
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ernmental and religious functions or a concert or dependency
of one upon the other to the end that official support of the
State or Federal Government would be placed behind the tenets of one or of all orthodoxies"). As we stated in Larkin v.
Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116, 125-126 (1983): "[T]he
mere appearance of a joint exercise of legislative authority by
Church and State provides a significant symbolic benefit to
··religion in the minds of some by reason of the power conferred." See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 274
(1982) (finding effect "incidental" and not "primary" because
it "does not confer any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices").
It follows that an important concern of the effects test is
whether the symbolic union of church and state effected by
the challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely to be
perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations as
an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval,
of their individual religious choices. The inquiry into this
kind of effect must be conducted with particular care when
many of the citizens perceiving the governmental message
are children in their formative years. 9 Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, supra, at 274; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672,
685-686 (1971). The symbolism of a union between church
and state is most likely to influence children of tender years,
whose experience is limited and whose beliefs consequently
are the function of environment as much as of free and voluntary choice.
Our school-aid cases have recognized a sensitivity to the
symbolic impact of the union of church and state. Grappling
9
For instance, this Court has held that prayers conducted at the commencement of a legislative session do not violate the Establishment
Clause, in part because of long historical usage and lack of particular sectarian content. Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3336 (1983). But
we have never indulged a similar assumption with respect to prayers conducted at the opening of the school day. School District of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 103 (1963); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421
(1962).
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with problems in many ways parallel to those we face today,
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948), held
that a public school may not permit part-time religious instruction on its premises as a part of the school program,
even if participation in that instruction is entirely voluntary
and even if the instruction itself is conducted only by nonpubJic-school personnel. Yet in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S.
306 (1952), the Courtheld that a similar program conducted
off the premises of the public school passed constitutional
muster. The difference in symbolic impact helps to explain
the difference between the cases. The symbolic connection
of church and state in the McCollum program presented the
students with a graphic symbol of "the concert or union or
dependency" of church and state, see Zorach, supra, at 312.
This very symbolic union was conspicuously absent in Z orach
program. 10
In the programs challenged in this case, the religious
school students spend their typical school day moving between religious-school and "public-school" classes. Both
types of classes take place in the same religious-school building and both are largely composed of students who are adherents of the same denomination. In this environment, the
students would be unlikely to discern the crucial difference
between the religious-school classes and the "public-school"
classes, even if the latter were successfully kept free of religious indoctrination. As one commentator has written:
This pervasive [religious] atmosphere makes on the
young student's mind a lasting imprint that the holy and
transcendental should be central to all facets of life. It
increases respect for the church as an institution to guide
one's total life adjustments and undoubtedly helps stimu°Compare Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 367-373 (1975) (invalidating program providing for state-funded remedial services on religiousschool premises) with Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 244-248 (1977)
(upholding program providing for similar services at neutral sites off the
premises of the religious school).
1
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late interest in religious vocations. . . . In short, the
parochial school's total operation serves to fulfill both
secular and religious functions concurrently, and the two
cannot be completely separated. Support of any part of
its activity entails some support of the disqualifying religious function of molding the religious personality of the
young student. Giannella, "Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal Development: Part II.
The Nonestablishment Principle," 81 Harv. L. Rev. 513,
574 (1968).

Consequently, even the student who notices the "public
school" sign 11 temporarily posted would have before him a
powerful symbol of state endorsement and encouragement of
the religious beliefs taught in the same class at some other
time during the day.
As Judge Fr ien,!lly, writing for the Second Circuit in the
comparuon case to the case at bar, stated:
Under the City's plan public school teachers are, so far
as appearance is concerned, a regular adjunct of the religious school. They pace the same halls, use classrooms
in the same building, teach the same students, and confer with the teachers hired by the religious schools,
many of them members of religious orders. The religious school appears to the public as a joint enterprise
staffed with some teachers paid by its religious sponsor
and others by ~he public. 739 F. 2d, at 68-69.
This effect-the symbolic union of government and religion in
one sectarian enterprise-is an impermissible effect under
the Establishment Clause.

(3)
Everson . Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947), the
Court stated that "[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can
be levied to su ort~ties or institutiOnS;
11

.

'

See note 2, supra .
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whatever thay may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion." !d., at 16. With but
one exception, our subsequent cases have struck down attempts by States to rna e payments out of ublic tax dollars
directl~ry
or secon ary re igious educa wna mstitu___..._,
tions:- See, e. g., Committee for Public Education v.
V:Nyquist, 413 U. S., at 774-781 (reimbursement for maintenan~ a~pair exp_en~es); Levitt v. Committee for Public
Education, 413 U. S. 472 (1973) (reimbursement for teacherprepared tests); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971)
(salary supplements for nonpublic school teachers). But see
Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646
(1980) (permitting public subsidy for certain routinized
recordkeeping and testing services performed by nonpublic
schools but required by state law).
As~nts, the C£_urt has distinguished between two cate aries of ro a
in which public funds are
used to finance secular activities that religious schools would
otherwise fund from their own resources. In the first category, the Court has noted that "it is well established . . . that )
not every law that confers an 'indirect,' 'remote,' or 'incidental' benefit upon religious institutions is, for that reason
alone, constitutionally invalid." Committee for Public E ducation v. N1J!l.ui_§t, supra, at 771; Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426 U. S. 736, 747 (1976); Hunt v. McNair,
413 U. S. 734, 742-743 (1973). In such "indirect" aid cases,
the government has used primarily secular means to accomplish a primarily secular end, and no "primary effect" of
advancing religion has thus been found. On this rationale,
the Court has upheld programs providing for loans of secular
textbooks to nonpublic school students, BoardO/Eau;atfun
v. A llen, supra; see also Wolman v. Walter,433 U. S., at
236-238; Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S., at 359-362, and programs providing b!!_s ~an~tion for nonpublic school children, Everson v. lJOaraofEducation, supra.

~~
~
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In the second category of cases, the Court has relied on the
Establishment Clause prohibition of forms of aid that provide
"direct and substantial advancement of the sectarian enterolman v. a ter, supra, at 250. In such "direct
prise.
aid" cases, the government, although acting for a secula.IlJtlrpOse,1i'a'S done so by directly supporting a reli ·ous instituas struck dowt;' state
tion. Under IS ra 10na e, e ou
··senemes providing for tuition grants and tax benefits for parents whose chi dren a en re g~ous sc oo , see oan v.
Lemon, 413 U. S. 825 (1973); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, supra, at 780-794, and programs providing
for "loan~structional materials to be used in religious
schools, see Wolman v. Walter, supra, at 248-251; Meek v.
Pittenger, supra, at 365. In Sloan and Nyquist, the aid was
fo~give11 !2~a!~nts an~to the rehg~ous
schools~ W11ileTn WOlman and Meek, the aid was in-kind assistance rather than the direct contribution of public funds.
Nonetheless, these differences in form were insufficient to
save ro ams whose effect was indistinguishable from that
of ..direct subsi y o the religious school.
us, the o _ as never accETI,>ted the mere possibili_llr of
subsidization;as-uie above cases demonstrate, as sufficient-to
i~an _,aid _J!rqgr,flm. On the other hand, this effect is
no whol y ummportant for Establishment Clause purposes.
If it were, the public schools could aduall take on themselVeSthe entire responsibility for teachin secular su ·ects
on ~lig!gus_scE-0~1 ~~es.
he question in each case must
bewnetner'tlleeliect OIJ he ,Erot'rered .ru,d IS "l'ld1rect and substantial," Com~or Public Education v. Nyquist,
at 784 n. 39, or indirect and incidental.'2 "The prob-

l

sup:;a,
12

This "indirect subsidy" effect only evokes Establishment Clause concerns when the public funds flow to "an institution in which religion is so
pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the
religious mission .. . "Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 743 (1973). In this
case, the District Court explicitly found that forty of the forty-one participating nonpublic schools were pervasively religious in this sense. 546 F.

fk_rf)
t-t..
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lem, like many problems in constitutional law, is one of
degree." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S., at 314. _ _ .
--wehave noted in the past that the religious school has dual
functions, providing its students with a secular education
while it promotes a particular religious perspective. See
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 783, - , [103 S. Ct. 3062, 3070]
(1983); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 248
""(1968).
In Meek and Wolman, we held unconstitutional
state programs providing for loans of instructional equipment
and materials to religious schools, on the ground that the programs advanced the "primary, religion-oriented educational
function of the sectarian school." Meek, supra, at 364;
Wolman, supra, at 248-251. Cf. Wolman, supra, at 243
(upholding provision of diagnostic services, which were
"'general welfare services for children that may be provided
by the State regardless of the incidental benefit that accrues
to church-related schools,"' quoting Meek, supra, at 371
n. 21). The programs challenged here, which provide teachers in addition to the instructional equipment and materials,
have a similar-and forbidden-effect of advancing religion.
This kind of direct aid t e educational function of the reli-} ~
gious school is ind1stinguisliable from the provision of a direct
A~ ../.A ~
f/
1
c~sh s~ to t e rehg~ous sc oo t at IS most clearly pro~~
hifiitea under the Establishment Clause.
~ a__
Petitioners claim that the aid here, like the textbooks in
Allen, flows primarily to the students, not to the religious
~ ~
schools. 13 Of course, all aid to religious schools ultimately
"flows to" the students, and petitioners' argument if accepted ~
would validate all forms of non-ideological aid to religious
Supp., at 1080. For this reason, the inquiry into whether the aid is "direct
and substantial" is necessary.
18
Petitioners also cite Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983), which
upheld a general tax deduction available to parents of all school children for
school expenses, including tuition to religious schools. Mueller, however,
is quite unlike the instant case. Unlike Mueller, the aid provided here is
unmediated by the tax code and the "numerous, private choices of individual parents of school-age children." !d., at 3069.

~

.
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schools, including those explicitly rejected in our prior cases.
Yet in Meek, we held unconstitutional the loan of instructional materials to religious schools and in Wolman, we rejected the fiction that a similar program could be saved by
masking it as aid to individual students. Wolman, supra,
433 U. S., at 249, n. 16. It follows a fortiori that the aid
here, which includes not only instructional materials but;'lso
··t~ieprovisiOn o instructional services b teachers in the
paroc Ia scfioo DUI i:lmg, "inescapably [has] the primary effect of providing a direct and substantial advancement of the (
] sectarian enterprise." !d., at 250. Where, as here, no
meaningful distinction can be made between aid to the student and aid to the school, "the concept of a loan to indiYiduals ~n." Wolmanv. Walter, 433 U. S.
229, 264 (opinion of POWELL, J.).
Petitioners also argue that this "subsidy" effect is not significant in this case, because the Community Education and
Shared Time programs supplemented the curriculum with
courses not previously offered in the religious schools and not
required by school rule or state regulation. Of course, this
fails to distinguish the programs here from those found unconstitutional in Meek. See 421 U. S., at 368. As in Meek,
we do not find that this feature of the program is controlling.
First, there is no way of knowing whether the religious
schools would have offered some or all of these courses if the
public school system had not offered them first. The distinction between courses that "supplement" and those that "supplant" the regular curriculum is therefore not nearly as clear
as petitioners allege. Second, although the precise courses
offered in these programs may have been new to the participating religious schools, their general subject matter-reading, math, etc.-was surely a part of the curriculum in the
past, and the concerns of the Establishment Clause may thus
be triggered despite the "supplemental" nature of the
courses. Cf. Meek v. Pittenger, supra, at 370-371. Third,
and most important, petitioners' argument would permit the
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public schools gradually to take over the entire secular
curriculum of the religious school, for the latter could surely
discontinue existing courses so that they might be replaced a
year or two later by a Community Education or Shared Time
course with the same content. The average religious school
student, for instance, now spends 10% of the school day in
Shared Time classes. But there is ~on }
·which this Court can impose a limit n h
cent e of the
~~
religious-school day that can be subsidized b the
ic
sc~enie out o the ot e in this case would
be to permit ever larger segments of the religious school
curriculum to be turned over to the public school system,
thus violating the cardinal principle that the State may not in
effect become the prime supporter of the religious school system. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S., at 624-625.

J

III
We conclude that the challenged programs have the effect
of promoting religion in three ways. 14 The state-paid instructors, influenced by the pervasively sectarian nature of
the religious schools in which they work, may subtly or
overtly indoctrinate the students in particular religious
tenets at public expense. The symbolic union of church and
state inherent in the provision of secular, state-provided instruction in the religious school buildings threatens to convey
a message of State support for religion to students and to the
general public. Finally, t~rograms in effect subsidize the
''reli ·o
nctions" of the parochial schools by taking over a
substantia o 1on o e1r responsibility for ~ar
sub ec s.
or t ese reaso s, e cone us1on 1s mescapa le
tnafthe Community Education and Shared Time programs
have the "primary or principal" effect of advancing religion,

l

1
'

Because of this conclusion, we need not detennine whether aspects of
the challenged programs impennissibly entangle the government in religious matters, in violation of the third prong of the Lemon test. But see
Aguilar v. Felton, U. S. (1985).

·.
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and therefore violate the dictates of the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.
Nonpublic schools have played an important role in the
development of American education, and we have long recognized that parents and their children have the right to choose
between public schools and available sectarian alternatives.
As the CHIEF JuSTICE noted in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
·u. S., at 625, "nothing we have said can be construed to disparage the role of church-related elementary and secondary
schools in our national life. Their contribution has been and
is enormous." But the Establishment Clause "rest[s] on the
belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion." Engel v. Vitale,
370 U. S. 421, 431 (1962). Therefore, "[t]he Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice, and
that while some involvement and entanglement are inevitable, lines must be drawn." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra,
at 625. Because "the controlling constitutional standards
have become firmly rooted and the broad contours of our inquiry are now well defined," Committee for Public Education v. Nyqu~t, 413 U. S., at 761, the position of those lines
has by now become quite clear and requires affirmance of the
Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.

I
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:
Re:

Lynda
No. 83-990 Grand Rapids School District v. Ball
Nos. 84-237, 84-238, 84-239 Aguilar v. Felton

Justice Brennan's drafts in these two school-aid
religion cases are now in, and I am quite pleased with them,
overall.

Both opinions are quite straightforward and deal with

this Court's precedent fairly and thoroughly.

On the basis of

accuracy and result, you could easily join both opinions as they
now stand.
In fact, I have no reservations about the opinion in
Grand Rapids, and I do recommend that you join it.

The draft

concludes that the Shared Time and Community Education programs
are unconstitutional because they have the primary effect of
advancing religion.

As I recall from our discussions prior to

oral argument, this was the ground you on which you preferred for
both cases to rest, rather than on the entanglement prong of the
Lemon v. Kurtzman test.
Aguilar, on the other hand, is decided on entanglement
grounds.

I seem to recall that you found that ground to be weak

under the facts of this case, where it seemed highly unlikely
that excessive entanglement in fact would result.

On the other

hand, under this Court's precedent, including Meek v. Pittenger,
Justice Brennan is entirely justified in relying on entanglement,
because of the extensive monitoring that occurred in the New York
programs to be sure teachers were not inculcating religious
beliefs.

In sum, you could join Aguilar, since it conforms

precisely to precedent.

Given your concerns expressed earlier,

however, you might want to write a brief c nc rrence stating that
----------~~~~~~ --- ~

the Title I programs inevitably have the primary effect of
advancing religion because they relieve the parochial schools of
providing supplementary and remedial educational courses.
Let me know if you want me to draft something.
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CHAMBERS OF'

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

April 2, 1985

Re:

83-990, School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball

Dear Bill,
I will be writing separately in this case.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMI!!IERS 01"

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

April 2, 1985

No. 83-990 - Grand Rapids School District
v. Ball

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference
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CHAMeERS 0,-

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

April 2, 1985

Re:

93-990 - Grand Rapids School District
v. Ball

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Ji
Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

April 8, 1985

83-990 - Grand Rapids School District
of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball

Dear Bill,
I

shall

await

other

writing

in

this

case.
Sincerely yours,

.·
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Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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May 9, 198S

83-990 Grand Rapids v. Ball
84-237 ~quilar v. Felton

Dear Bill:
Pleas~

that

join

rn~

in

tr.~s~

two

I am circulating a concurring opinion in Aguliar
additional views.

~xpresse£

Sincere~. y,

Justice Brennan
1 fp/ss

cc:

' ..

case~.

The Conference

.hFtmt QIDlU't &tf tlft 'Jlnittb •hdt•
:.ufrington. ~. QI. 2Dc?"~
CHAMBERS 01"

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

May 13, 1985

Re: No. 83-990, School District of City of Grand Rapids v. Ball
Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference

jlu:pt"tntt

(!f£tnft of tlft ~b .t\tatu

1Dasltinghtn. ~.Of. 211~~~
CHAMI!IERS 01'"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

May 15, 1985

Re:

No. 83-990-School District of Grand Rapids v.
Ball

Dear Bill:
I would go along with the change proposed in
the paragraph on pages 8-9.
Sincerely,

~T.M.

Justice Brennan
cc:

Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Stevens

,.

CHAMI!!IERS 01'"

.JUSTICE

w.. . .J . 5RENNAN, .JR .

May 15, 1985

Dear Thurgood, Harry, Lewis and John:
I would like to suggest a change in the
paragraph at pages 8-9 of the draft opinion in
School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball along the
lines of the attached. Would you let me know if
this, or something like it, meets with your
approval?
Sincerely,

Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice

Marshall
Blackmun
Powell
Stevens

Attachment

'"'

,...

To replace paragraph at pp. 8-9 of Grand Rapids draft:

In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403

u.s.,

at 612-613, we stated:

Every analysis in this area must begin with
consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by
the Court over many years. Three such tests may be
gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion, Board of Education v. Allen, 392
u.s. 236, 243 (1968); finally, the statute must not
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion.' Walz [v. Tax Commission, 397 u.s. 664, 674
(1970)]."
The Lemon test arose not from a single case, but instead
reflected the lessons of the developing body of this Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.

See, e.g., School District

of Abington Township v. Schempp, supra, at 222.

Although various

parties with divergent views of the mandates of the Establishment
Clause have pointed to perceived failings in the Lemon test over
the years, we have never adopted any other general test for
detecting state action that transgresses the limits of the
Establishment Clause.

The Lemon test concentrates attention on

the issues--purpose, effect, entanglement--that determine whether
a particular state action is an improper "law respecting the
Establishment of religion."

We therefore reaffirm that state
~

action alleged to violate the Establishment
measured against .the Lemon criteria.

'

'

Clause1ftY~
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:
Re:

Lynda
Justice Brennan's Lemon paragraph for Grand Rapids v. Ball
I spoke to Lee about your concerns about Justice

Brennan's statement at the end of his proposed paragraph that
"[w]e therefore affirm that state action alleged to violate the
Establishment Clause must be measured against the Lemon
criteria."

It is true that Marsh v. Chambers did not apply

Lemon; however, your opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree cites Marsh as
the only exception.

Lee and I both feel that it would be

contrary to your strong support of Lemon to suggest now that
Lemon need not always be applied.

Perhaps you could suggest to

Justice Brennan that he change "must" in his last sentence to
"should."

Thus, the sentence would read:

"We therefore affirm

that state action alleged to violate the Establishment Clause
should be measured against the Lemon criteria."

This suggests no

lessening of support for the Lemon test, while leaving Marsh to
stand as the historical oddity that it is.

,·.
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.JUSTICE
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May 16, 1985

w... .J . BRENNAN, .JR.

Dear Thurgood, Harry, Lewis and John:
The change I suggested in the Grand Rapids op1n1on was
satisfactory to Thurgood and Harry. John, however, has suggested
that the last two sentences of the revision instead be added to
the paragraph as it stands in the current draft.
The two
sentences
read
as
follows:
"The Lemon test concentrates
attention on the issues--purpose, effect, entanglement--that
determine whether a particular state action is an improper 'law
respecting the Establishment of religion.' We therefore reaffirm
that state action alleged to violate the Establishment Clause
must be measured against the Lemon criteria." This is fine with
me.
Sincerely,
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Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice

Marshall
Blackmun
Powell
Stevens
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81-990 School District of Grand

~apids

v . Ball

Dear Bill:
I could aaree with either vour suggested new lan or with Jn~n's suagPstion, provide~ in eit~er C3Se
that t~P. •,;0rr1 "should" he substit 1 Jt~d for "must" in the
final sentC'nce.

quag~

1\s 'lW ~o.,curr.ir.o opinions in thn Pendinq cases
maJ<e c1 e~r, T full" r,u';)nort Lemon. I sl:v <J\'lf'lV from uc:;ing
t~e word "must," however, as it is stronger than necessarv .
Bearinq M~rsh v. ~ham~ers in mind, it occurs to m~ t~at none
of us c~n f'0rosee ~··'f1etl1er in some ftJtnr"? case application of
the Lemon test alone would not he dispositive .
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- either
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constructive.
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May 16, 1985

..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 83-990, Grand Rapids School District v. Ball

Dear Bill:
I am still with you, and whatever you and John work out
is all right with me.
Sincerely,

.-

Justice Brennan
cc:

Justice Marshall
Justice Powell
Justice Stevens
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-990

GRAND RAPIDS SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY
OF GRAND RAPIDS, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
PHYLLIS BALL ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[May-, 1985]

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The School District of Grand Rapids, Michigan, adopted
. two programs in which classes for nonpublic school students
are financed by the public school system, taught by teachers
hired by the public school system, and conducted in "leased"
classrooms in the nonpublic schools. Most of the nonpublic
schools involved in the programs are sectarian religious
schools. This case raises the question whether these programs impermissibly involve the government in the support
of sectarian religious activities and thus violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
I
A
At issue in this case are the Community Education and
Shared Time programs offered in the nonpublic schools of
Grand Rapids, Michigan. These programs, first instituted
in the 1976-1977 school year, provide classes to nonpublic
school students at public expense in classrooms located in and
leased from the local nonpublic schools.
The Shared Time program offers classes during the regular
school day that are intended to be supplementary to the "core
curriculum" courses that the State of Michigan requires as a

•
83-990---0PINION
GRAND RAPIDS SCHOOL DISTRICT v. BALL

2

part of an accredited school program. Among the subjects
offered are "remedial" and "enrichment" mathematics, "remedial" and "enrichment" reading, art, music, and physical
education. A typical nonpublic school student attends these
classes for one or two class periods per week; approximately
"ten percent of any given nonpublic school student's time
'during the academic year would consist of Shared Time instruction." Americans United for Separation of Church
and State v. School Dist. of Grand Rapids, 46 F. Supp. 1071, .
1079 (WD Mich. 1982). Although Shared Time itself is a program offered only in the nonpublic schools, there was testimony that the courses included in that program are offered,
albeit perhaps in a somewhat different form, in the public
schools as well. All of the classes that are the subject of this
case are taught in elementary schools, with the exception of
Math Topics, a remedial math course taught in the secondary
schools. 1
•
The Shared Time teachers are full-time employees of the
public schools, who often move from classroom to classroom
during the course of the school day. A "significant portion"
of the teachers (approximately 10%) "previously taught in
nonpublic schools, and many of those had been assigned to
the same nonpublic school where they were previously employed." I d., at 1078. The School District of Grand Rapids
hires Shared Time teachers in accordance with its ordinary
Shared Time and Community Education courses are taught at the elementary and secondary level in nonpublic schools. However, after the
District Court found for respondents and enjoined the further operation of
the programs, petitioners did not appeal the decision to the extent that it
involved "physical education and industrial arts shared time classes at the
secondary level and community education classes at the secondary level."
App. 39. Thus, the appeal involved only Shared Time classes at the elementary level, Community Education classes at the elementary level, and
the remedial math Shared Time class at the secondary level. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State v. School Dist. of Grand Rapids , 718 F. 2d, at 1389, 1390 (1983). These are the only programs whose
constitutionality is now before the Court.
1
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hiring procedures. Ibid. The public school system apparently provides all of the supplies, materials, and equipment
used in connection with Shared Time instruction. See App.
341.

The Community Education Program is offered throughout
·the Grand Rapids community in schools and on other sites,
for children as well as adults. The classes at issue here are
taught in the nonpublic elementary schools and commence at .
the conclusion of the regular school day. Among the courses
offered are Arts and Crafts, Home Economics, Spanish,
Gymnastics, Yearbook Production, Christmas Arts and
Crafts, Drama, Newspaper, Humanities, Chess, Model
Building, and Nature Appreciation. The District Court
found that "[a]lthough certain Community Education courses
· offered at nonpublic school sites are not offered at the public
schools on a Community Education basis, all Community
Education programs are otherwise available at the public
schools, usually as a part of their more extensive regular
curriculum." 546 F. Supp., at 1079.
Community Education teachers are part-time public school
employees. Community Education courses are completely
voluntary and are offered only if 12 or more students enroll.
Because a well-known teacher is necessary to attract the requisite number of students, the School District accords a preference in hiring to instructors already teaching within the
school. Thus, "virtually every Community Education course
conducted on facilities leased from nonpublic schools has an
instructor otherwise employed full time by the same nonpublic school." Ibid.
Both programs are administered similarly. The Director
of the program, a public school employee, sends packets of
course listings to the participating nonpublic schools before
the school year begins. The nonpublic school administrators
then decide which courses they want to offer. The Director
works out an academic schedule for each school, taking into

0
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account, inter alia, the varying religious holidays celebrated
by the schools of different denominations.
Nonpublic school administrators decide which classrooms
will be used for the programs, and the Director then inspects
the facilities and consults with Shared Time teachers to make
.sure the facilities are satisfactory. The public schoo~ system
pays the nonpublic schools for the use of the necessary classroom space by entering into "leases" at the rate of $6 per
classroom per week. The "leases," however, contain no ·
mention of the particular room, space, or facility leased and
teachers' rooms, libraries, lavatories, and similar facilities
are made available at no additional charge. Id., at 1077.
Each room used in the programs has to be free of any crucifix, religious symbol, or artifact, although such religious symbols can be present in the adjoining hallways, corridors, and
other facilities used in connection with the program. During
the time that a given classroom is being used in the programs, the teacher is required to post a sigil stating that it is
a "public school classroom." 2 However, there are no signs
posted outside the school buildings indicating that public
school courses are conducted inside or that the facilities are
being used as a public school annex.
Although petitioners label the Shared Time and Community Education students as "part-time public school students," the students attending Shared Time and Community
Education courses in facilities leased from a nonpublic school
are the same students who attend that particular school otherwise. Id., at 1078. There is no evidence that any public
school student has ever attended a Shared Time or Community Education class in a nonpublic school. Id., at 1097.
2

The signs read as follows: "GRAND RAPIDS PUBLIC SCHOOLS'
ROOM. THIS ROOM HAS BEEN LEASED BY THE GRAND RAPIDS PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT, FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONDUCTING PUBLIC SCHOOL EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS. THE
ACTIVITY IN THIS ROOM IS CONTROLLED SOLELY BY THE
GRAND RAPIDS PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT." App. 200.
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The District Court found that "[t]hough Defendants claim the
Shared Time program is available to all students, the record
is abundantly clear that only nonpublic school students wearing the cloak of a 'public school student' can enroll in it."
Ibid. The District Court noted that "[w]hereas public school
·students are assembled at the public facility nearest,to their
residence, students in religious schools are assembled on the
basis of religion without any consideration of residence or .
school district boundaries." Id., at 1093. Thus, "beneficiaries are wholly designated on the basis of religion," ibid., and
these "public school" classes, in contrast to ordinary public
school classes which are largely neighborhood-based, are as
segregated by religion as are the schools at which they are
offered. 3
Forty of the forty-one schools at which the programs operate are sectarian in character. 4 The schools of course vary
from one another, but substantial evidence suggests that
they share deep religious purposes. For instance, the Parent Handbook of one Catholic school states the goals of Catholic education as "[a] God oriented environment which permeates the total educational program," "[a] Christian atmosphere which guides and encourages participation in the
church's commitment to social justice," and "[a] continuous
development of knowledge of the Catholic faith, its traditions, teachings and theology." I d., at 1080. A policy statement of the Christian schools similarly proclaims that "it is
not sufficient that the teachings of Christianity be a separate
subject in the curriculum, but the Word of God must be an
all-pervading force in the educational program." I d., at
As would be expected, a large majority of the students attending religious schools belong to the denomination that controls the school. The
District Court found, for instance, that approximately 85 percent of the
students at the Catholic schools are Catholic. 546 F. Supp., at 1080.
• Twenty-eight of the schools are Roman Catholic, seven are Christian
Reformed, three are Lutheran, one is Seventh Day Adventist, and one is
Baptist.
3

0

83-990--0PINION
6

GRAND RAPIDS SCHOOL DISTRICT v. BALL

1081. These Christian schools require all parents seeking to
enroll their children either to subscribe to a particular doctrinal statement or to agree to have their children taught according to the doctrinal statement. The District Court
found that the schools are "pervasively sectarian," id., at
.1096, n. 13, and .concluded "without hesitation that the purposes of these schools is to advance their particular religions," id., at 1096, and that "a substantial portion of their
functions are subsumed in the religious mission." I d., at ·
1084.
B

Respondents are six taxpayers who filed suit against the
School District of Grand Rapids and a number of state officials. They charged that the Shared Time and Community
Education programs violated the Establishment Clause of
tne First Amendment of the Constitution, made applicable to
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 ·u. S. 1 (1947). After an 8-day
bench trial, the District Court entered a judgment on the
merits on behalf of respondents and enjoined further operation of the programs. •
Applying the familiar three-part purpose, effect, and entanglement test set out in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602
~ Petitioners alleged that respondents lacked taxpayer standing under
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 (1968), and Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U. S. 464
(1982). The District Court and the Court of Appeals rejected the standing
challenge. We affirm this finding, relying on the numerous cases in which
we have adjudicated Establishment Clause challenges by state taxpayers
to programs for aiding nonpublic schools. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter,
433 U. S. 229 (1977); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426 U. S.
736, 744 (1976); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 356-357, n. 6 (1975);
Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S. 825 (1973); Committee for Public Education v.
Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 762 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 735
(1973); Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, 413 U. S. 472, 478
(1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 608, 611 (1971); Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 3 (1947).
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(1971), the court held that, although the purpose of the programs was secular, their effect was "distinctly impermissible." 546 F. Supp., at 1093. The court relied in particular
on the fact that the programs at issue involved publicly provided instructional services that served nonpublic school students segregated largely by religion on nonpublic school
premises. The court also noted that the programs conferred
"direct benefits, both financial and otherwise, to the sectarian institutions." /d., at 1094. Finally, the court found that
the programs necessarily entailed an unacceptable level of ·
entanglement, both political and administrative, between the
public school systems and the sectarian schools. Petitioners
appealed the judgment of the District Court to the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. A divided panel of the Court
of Appeals affirmed. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State v. School Dist. of Grand Rapids, 718 F. 2d
1389 (1983). We granted certiorari, 465 U. S. - - (1984),
and now affirm.
II
A

The First Amendment's guarantee that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion," as our
cases demonstrate, is more than a pledge that no single religion will be designated as a state religion. Committee for
Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 771 (1973);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 602, 612 (1971); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 442 (1961). It is also more than a
mere injunction that governmental programs discriminating
among religions are unconstitutional. See, e. g., Abington
School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 216-217 (1963);
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 211 (1948).
The Establishment Clause instead primarily proscribes
"sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of
the sovereign in religious activity." Nyquist, supra, at 772;
see also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664, 668 (1970). As
Justice Black, writing for the Court in Everson v. Board of

0
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Education, supra, at 15-16, stated: "Neither [a State nor the
Federal Government] can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. . . . No
tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support
any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatev.er form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion."
Since Everson made clear that the guarantees of the
Establishment Clause apply to the States, we have often ·
grappled with the problem of state aid to nonpublic, religious
schools. In all of these cases, our goal has been to give
meaning to the sparse language and broad purposes of the
Clause, while not unduly infringing on the ability of the
States to provide for the welfare of their people in accordance
with their own particular circumstances. Providing for the
education of schoolchildren is surely a praiseworthy purpose.
But our cases have consistently recognized that even such a
·praiseworthy, secular purpose cannot validate government
aid to parochial schools when the aid has the effect of promoting a single religion or religion generally or when the aid unduly entangles the government in matters religious. For
just as religion throughout history has provided spiritual
comfort, guidance, and inspiration to many, it can also serve
powerfully to divide societies and to exclude those whose beliefs are not in accord with particular religions or sects that
have from time to time achieved dominance. The solution to
this problem adopted by the Framers and consistently recognized by this Court is jealously to guard the right of every
individual to worship according to the dictates of conscience
while requiring the government to maintain a course of neutrality among religions, and between religion and nonreligion. Only in this way can we "make room for as wide a
variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of man
deem necessary" and "sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows no partiality to any one group and lets
each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the ap-

.·
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peal of its dogma." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 313
(1952).

We have noted that the three-part test first articulated in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, at 612-613, guides "[t]he general nature of our inquiry in this area," Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S.
388, 394 (1983):

"Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the· Court
over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned
from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236,
243 (1968); finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' W alz [v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970)]." Lemon v.
Kurtzman, at 612-613.
These tests "must not be viewed as setting the precise limits
to the necessary constitutional inquiry, but serve only as
guidelines with which to identify instances in which the
objectives of the Establishment Clause have been impaired."
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 359 (1975). We have particularly relied on Lemon in every case involving the sensitive relationship between government and religion in the
education of our children. The government's activities in
this area can have a magnified impact on impressionable
young minds, and the occasional rivalry of parallel public and
private school systems offers an all-too-ready opportunity for
divisive rifts along religious lines in the body politic. See
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, supra, at 796798; Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 622-624. The Lemon
test concentrates attention on the issues-purposes, effect,
entanglement-that determine whether a particular state action is an improper "law respecting an establishment of religion." We therefore reaffirm that state action alleged to vi-

•
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olate the Establishment Clause should be measured against
the Lemon criteria.
As has often been true in school aid cases, there is no dispute as to the first test. Both the District Court and the
Court of Appeals found that the purpose of the Community
.Education and Shared Time programs was "manifestly secular." 546 F. Supp., at 1085; see also 718 F. 2d, at 1398. We
find no reason to disagree with this holding, and therefore go
on to consider whether the primary or principal effect of the ·
challenged programs is to advance or inhibit religion.
B

Our inquiry must begin with a consideration of the nature
of the institutions in which the programs operate. Of the 41
private schools where these "part-time public schools" have
operated, 40 are identifiably religious schools. It is true that
each school may not share all of the characteristics of religious schools as articulated, for example, in the complaint in
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 356 (1975); see also Lemon
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 615. The District Court found, however, that "[b]ased upon the massive testimony and exhibits,
the conclusion is inescapable that the religious institutions receiving instructional services from the public schools are sectarian in the sense that a substantial portion of their functions are subsumed in the religious mission." 546 F. Supp.,
at 1084; see Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 735 (1973); Meek
v. Pittenger, supra, at 366 ("[t]he very purpose of many of
those schools is to provide an integrated secular and religious
education); Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S., at 671 ("to
assure future adherents to a particular faith" is "an affirmative if not dominant policy of church schools"). At the religious schools here-as at the sectarian schools that have been
the subject of our past cases-"the secular education those
schools provide goes hand in hand with the religious mission
that is the only reason for the schools' existence. Within
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that institution, the two are inextricably intertwined." 6
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S., at 657 (opinion of BRENNAN,
J.). See also Meek v. Pittenger, supra, at 365-366; Board of
Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 245, 247-248 (1968).
Given that 40 of the 41 schools in this case are thus "pervasively sectarian," the challenged public-school programs operating in the religious schools may impermissibly advance
religion in three different ways. First, the teachers particiP?ting in the programs may become involved in intentionally
or inadvertently inculcating particular religious tenets ' or beliefs. Second, the programs may provide a crucial symbolic
link between government and religion, thereby enlisting-at
least in the eyes of impressionable youngsters-the powers of
government to the support of the religious denomination operating the school. Third, the programs may have the effect
of directly promoting religion by impermissibly providing a
subsidy to the primary religious mission of the institutions
affected.
(1)

Although Establishment Clause jurisprudence is characterized by few absolutes, the Clause does absolutely prohibit
government-financed or government-sponsored indoctrination into the beliefs of a particular religious faith. See Stone
v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam); Meek v.
Pittenger, supra, at 370; Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 619
("The State must be certain, given the Religion Clauses, that
The elementary and secondary schools in this case differ substantially
from the colleges that we refused to characterize as "pervasively sectarian"
in Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426 U. S., at 755-759 (1976).
See also Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U. S. 672 (1971). Many of the schools in this case include prayer and attendance at religious services as a part of their curriculum, are run by
churches or other organizations whose members must subscribe to particular religious tenets, have faculties and student bodies composed largely of
adherents of the particular denomination, and give preference in attendance to children belonging to the denomination. 546 F. Supp., at
6

1080-1084.
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subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion"); Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, 413 U. S. 472, 480 (1973)
("[T]he State is constitutionally compelled to assure that the
state-supported activity is not being used for religious indoctrination"); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 429 (1962); Zorach
.v. Clauson, 343 U. S., at 314 ("Government may not finance
·religious groups rtor undertake religious instruction nor blend
secular and sectarian education ... "). Such indoctrination,
if permitted to occur, would have devastating effects on the .
right of each individual voluntarily to determine what to believe (and what not to believe) free of any coercive pressures
from the State, while at the same time tainting the resulting
religious beliefs with a corrosive secularism.
In Meek v. Pittenger, supra, the Court invalidated a statute providing for the loan of state-paid professional staffincluding teachers-to nonpublic schools to provide remedial
and accelerated instruction, guidance counseling and testing,
arid other services on the premises of the nonpublic schools.
Such a program, if not subjected to a "comprehensive,
discriminating, and continuing state surveillance," Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U. S., at 619 (quoted in Meek, supra, at 370),
would entail an unacceptable risk that the the state-sponsored instructional personnel would "advance the religious
mission of the church-related schools in which they serve."
Meek, 421 U. S., at 370. Even though the teachers were
paid by the State, "[t]he potential for impermissible fostering
of religion under these circumstances, although somewhat reduced, is nonetheless present." ld., at 372. The program
in Meek, if not sufficiently monitored, would simply have entailed too great a risk of state-sponsored indoctrination.
The programs before us today share the defect that we
identified in Meek. With respect to the Community Education Program, the District Court found that "virtually every
Community Education course conducted on facilities leased
from nonpublic schools has an instructor otherwise employed
full time by the same nonpublic school." 546 F. Supp., at

83-990-0PINION
GRAND RAPIDS SCHOOL DISTRICT v. BALL

13

These instructors, many of whom no doubt teach in
the religious schools precisely because they are adherents of
the controlling denomination and want to serve their religious community zealously, are expected during the regular
school day to inculcate their students with the tenets and beiiefs of their particular religious faiths. Yet the premise of
the program is that those instructors can put aside their religious convictions and engage in entirely secular Community .
Education instruction as soon as the school day is over.
Moreover, they are expected to do so before the same religious-school students and in the same religious-school classrooms that they employed to advance religious purposes during the "official" school day. Nonetheless, as petitioners
themselves asserted, Community Education classes are not
specifically monitored for religious content. App. 353.
We do not question that the dedicated and professional religious school teachers employed by the Community Education program will attempt in good faith to perform their secular mission conscientiously. Cf. Lemon, 403 U. S., at
618-619. Nonetheless, there is a substantial risk that,
overtly or subtly, the religious message they are expected to
convey during the regular school day will infuse the supposedly secular classes they teach after school. The danger
arises "not because the public employee [is] likely deliberately to subvert his task to the service of religion, but rather
because the pressures of the environment might alter his behavior from its normal course." Wolman v. Walter, 433
U. S. 229, 247 (1977). "The conflict of functions inheres in
the situation." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 617.
The Shared Time program, though structured somewhat
differently, nonetheless also poses a substantial risk of statesponsored indoctrination. The most important difference
between the programs is that most of the instructors in the
Shared Time program are full-time teachers hired by the
public schools. Moreover, although "virtually every" Community Education instructor is a full-time religious school
1079.

'
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teacher, 546 F. Supp., at 1079, only "[a] significant portion"
of the Shared Time instructors previously worked in the
religious schools. 7 Id., at 1078. Nonetheless, as with the
Community Education program, no attempt is made to
monitor the Shared Time courses for religious content.
App. 330. 8
Thus, despite these differences between the two programs,
our holding in Meek controls the inquiry with respect to
Shared Time, as well as Community Education. Shared
Time instructors are teaching academic subjects in religious
schools in courses virtually indistinguishable from the other
courses offered during the regular religious-school day. The
teachers in this program, even more than their Community
Education colleagues, are "performing important educational
services in schools in which education is an integral part of
the dominant sectarian mission and in which an atmosphere
dedicated to the advancement of religious belief is constantly
maintained." Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S., at 371. Teachers in such an atmosphere may well subtly (or overtly) conform their instruction to the environment in which they
teach, while students will perceive the instruction provided
in the context of the dominantly religious message of the institution, thus reinforcing the indoctrinating effect. As we
stated in Meek, "[w]hether the subject is 'remedial reading,'
'advanced reading,' or simply 'reading,' a teacher remains a
teacher, and the danger that religious doctrine will become
intertwined with secular instruction persists." I d., at 370.
Unlike types of aid that the Court has upheld, such as statecreated standardized tests, Committee for Public Education
7
Approximately 10 percent of the Shared Time instructors were previously employed by the religious schools, and many of these were reassigned back to the school at which they had previously taught.
8
The public school system does include Shared Time teachers in its ordinary teacher evaluation program, which subjects them to evaluation once
each year during their first year of teaching and once every three years
after that. App. 54, 330.
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v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646 (1980), or diagnostic services,
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S., at 241-244, there is a "substantial risk" that programs operating in this environment
would "be used for religious educational purposes." Committee for Public Education v. Regan, supra, at 656 .
• The Court of Appeals of course recognized that respondents adduced no evidence of specific incidents of religious
indoctrination in this case. 718 F. 2d, at 1404. But the
absence of proof of specific incidents is not dispositive.
When conducting a supposedly secular class in the pervasively sectarian environment of a religious school, a teacher
may knowingly or unwillingly tailor the content of the course
to fit the school's announced goals. If so, there is no reason
to believe that this kind of ideological influence would be detected or reported by students, by their parents, or by the
school system itself. The students are presumably attending religious schools precisely in order to receive religious instruction. Mter spending the balance of their school day in
classes heavily influenced by a religious perspective, they
would have little motivation or ability to discern improper
ideological content that may creep into a Shared Time or
Community Education course. Neither their parents nor
the parochial schools would have cause to complain if the effect of the publicly-supported instruction were to advance the
schools' sectarian mission. And the public school system itself has no incentive to detect or report any specific incidents
of improper state-sponsored indoctrination. Thus, the lack
of evidence of specific incidents of indoctrination is of little
significance.
(2)
Our cases have recognized that the Establishment Clause
guards against more than direct, state-funded efforts to indoctrinate youngsters in specific religious beliefs. Government promotes religion as effectively when it fosters a close
identification of its powers and responsibilities with those of
any-or all-religious denominations as when it attempts to
•
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inculcate specific religious doctrines. If this identification
conveys a message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion, a core purpose of the Establishment
Clause is violated. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. - - ,
- - (1984) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); cf. Abington School
District v. Schempp, 374 U. S., at 222 (history teaches that
"powerful sects or groups might bring about a fusion of governmental and religious functions or a concert or dependency
of one upon the other to the end that official support of the
State or Federal Government would be placed behind the tenets of one or of all orthodoxies"). As we stated in Larkin v.
Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116, 125-126 (1984): "[T]he
mere appearance of a joint exercise of legislative authority by
Church and State provides a significant symbolic benefit to
religion in the minds of some by reason of the power conferred." See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 274
(1981) (finding effect "incidental" and not "primary'' because
it "does not confer any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices").
It follows that an important concern of the effects test is
whether the symbolic union· of church and state effected by
the challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely to be
perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations as
an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval,
of their individual religious choices. The inquiry into this
kind of effect must be conducted with particular care when
many of the citizens perceiving the governmental message
are children in their formative years. 9 Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, supra, at 274; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672,
9

For instance, this Court has held that prayers conducted at the commencement of a legislative session do not violate the Establishment
Clause, in part because of long historical usage and lack of particular sectarian content. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783, 795 (1983). But we
have never indulged a similar assumption with respect to prayers conducted at the opening of the school day. Abington School District v.
Schempp, 374 U. S. 103 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962).
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The symbolism of a union between church
and state is most likely to influence children of tender years,
whose experience is limited and whose beliefs consequently
are the function of environment as much as of free and voluntary choice.
· Our school-aid cases have recognized a sensitivity ,to the
symbolic impact of the union of church and state. Grappling
with problems in many ways parallel to those we face today,
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948), held
that a public school may not permit part-time religious instruction on its premises as a part of the school program,
even if participation in that instruction is entirely voluntary
and even if the instruction itself is conducted only by nonpublic-school personnel. Yet in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S.
306 (1952), the Court held that a similar program conducted
off the premises of the public school passed constitutional
muster. The difference in symbolic impact helps to explain
the difference between the cases. The symbolic connection
of church and state in the McCollum program presented the
students with a graphic symbol of the "concert or union or
dependency'' of church and state, see Zorach, supra, at 312.
This very symbolic union was conspicuously absent in the
Z orach program. 10
In the programs challenged in this case, the religious
school students spend their typical school day moving between religious-school and "public-school" classes. Both
types of classes take place in the same religious-school building and both are largely composed of students who are adherents of the same denomination. In this environment, the
students would be unlikely to discern the crucial difference
between the religious-school classes and the "public-school"

685-686 (1971).

°Compare Meek

1

v. Pittenger, 421 U. S., at 367-373 (invalidating pro-

gram providing for state-funded remedial services on religious-school

premises) with Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S., at 244-248 (upholding program providing for similar services at neutral sites off the premises of the
religious school).
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classes, even if the latter were successfully kept free of religious indoctrination. As one commentator has written:
"This pervasive [religious] atmosphere makes on the
young student's mind a lasting imprint that the holy and
transcendental should be central to all facets of life. It
increases respect for the church as an institution to guide
one's total life'adjustments and undoubtedly helps ·stimulate interest in religious vocations. . . . In short, the
parochial school's total operation serves to fulfill both
secular and religious functions concurrently, and the two
cannot be completely separated. Support of any part of
its activity entails some support of the disqualifying religious function of molding the religious personality of the
young student." Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal Development: Part II.
The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 513,
574 (1968).

Consequently, even the student who notices the "public
school" sign 11 temporarily posted would have before him a
powerful symbol of state endorsement and encouragement of
the religious beliefs taught in the same class at some other
time during the day.
As Judge Friendly, writing for the Second Circuit in the
companion case to the case at bar, stated:
Under the City's plan public school teachers are, so far
as appearance is concerned, a regular adjunct of the religious school. They pace the same halls, use classrooms
in the same building, teach the same students, and confer with the teachers hired by the religious schools,
many of them members of religious orders. The religious school appears to the public as a joint enterprise
staffed with some teachers paid by its religious sponsor
and others by the public. Felton v. Secretary, United
States Dept. of Ed., 739 F. 2d 48, at 67-68.
11

See n. 2, supra.
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This effect-the symbolic union of government and religion in
one sectarian enterprise-is ail impermissible effect under
the Establishment Clause.
(3)

In Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947), the
Court stated that "[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can
be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever thay may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion." I d., at 16. With but
one exception, our subsequent cases have struck down attempts by States to make payments out of public tax dollars
directly to primary or secondary religious educational institutions. See, e. g., Committee for Public Education v.
Nyquist, 413 U. S., at 774-781 (reimbursement for maintenance and repair expenses); Levitt v. Committee for Public
Education, 413 U. S. 472 (1973) (reimbursement for teacherprepared tests); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971)
(salary supplements for nonpublic school teachers). But see
Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646
(1980) (permitting public subsidy for certain routinized
recordkeeping and testing services performed by nonpublic
schools but required by state law).
Aside from cash payments, the Court has distinguished between two categories of programs in which public funds are
used to finance secular activities that religious schools would
otherwise fund from their own resources. In the first category, the Court has noted that it is "well established . . . that
not every law that confers an 'indirect,' 'remote,' or 'incidental' benefit upon religious institutions is, for that reason
alone, constitutionally invalid." Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, supra, at 771; Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426 U. S. 736, 747 (1976); Hunt v. McNair,
413 U. S., at 742-743. In such "indirect" aid cases, the government has used primarily secular means to accomplish a
primarily secular end, and no "primary effect" of advancing
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religion has th~s been found. On this rationale, the Court
has upheld programs providing for loans of secular textbooks
to nonpublic school students, Board of Education v. Allen,
392 U. S. 236 (1968); see also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S.,
at 236-238; Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S., at 359-362, and
programs providing bus transportation for nonpublic ,school
children, Everson v. Board of Education, supra.
In the second category of cases, the Court has relied on the
Establishment Clause prohibition of forms of aid that provide
"direct and substantial advancement of the sectarian enterprise." Wolman v. Walter, supra, at 250. In such "direct
aid" cases, the government, although acting for a secular purpose, has done so by directly supporting a religious institution. Under this rationale, the Court has struck down state
schemes providing for tuition grants and tax benefits for parents whose children attend religious school, see Sloan v.
Lemon, 413 U. S. 825 (1973); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, supra, at 780-794, and programs providing
for "loan" of instructional materials to be used in religious
schools, see Wolman v. Walter, supra, at 248-251; Meek v.
Pittenger, supra, at 365. In Sloan and Nyquist, the aid was
formally given to parents and not directly to the religious
schools, while in Wolman and Meek, the aid was in-kind assistance rather than the direct contribution of public funds.
Nonetheless, these differences in form were insufficient to
save programs whose effect was indistinguishable from that
of a direct subsidy to the religious school.
Thus, the Court has never accepted the mere possibility of
subsidization, as the above cases demonstrate, as sufficient to
invalidate an aid program. On the other hand, this effect is
not wholly unimportant for Establishment Clause purposes.
If it were, the public schools could gradually take on themselves the entire responsibility for teaching secular subjects
on religious school premises. The question in each case must
be whether the effect of the proffered aid is "direct and substantial," Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,

.

,., -·~
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supra, at 784-785, n. 39, or indirect and incidental. 12 "The
problem, like many problems in constitutional law, is one of
degree." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S., at 314.
We have noted in the past that the religious school has dual
functions, providing its students with a secular education
while it promotes a particular religious perspective. See
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S., at 401-402; Board of Education
v. Allen, supra. .In Meek and Wolman, we held unconstitutional state programs providing for loans of instrU.ctional
equipment and materials to religious schools, on the ground
that the programs advanced the "primary, religion-oriented ·
educational function of the sectarian school." Meek, supra,
at 364; Wolman, supra, at 248-251. Cf. Wolman, supra, at
243 (upholding provision of diagnostic services, which were
"'general welfare services for children that may be provided
by the State regardless of the incidental benefit that accrues
to church-related schools,"' quoting Meek, supra, at 371,
n. 21). The programs challenged here, which provide teachers in addition to the instructional equipment and materials,
have a simil~r-and forbidden-effect of advancing religion.
This kind of direct aid to the educational function of the religious school is indistinguishable from the provision of a direct
cash subsidy to the religious school that is most clearly prohibited under the Establishment Clause.
Petitioners claim that the aid here, like the textbooks in
Allen, flows primarily to the students, not to the religious
schools. 13 Of course, all aid to religious schools ultimately
12
This "indirect subsidy" effect only evokes Establishment Clause concerns when the public funds flow to "an institution in which religion is so
pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the
religious mission .. ."Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S., at 743. In this case,
the District Court explicitly found that forty of the forty-one participating
nonpublic schools were pervasively religious in this sense. 546 F. Supp.,
at 1080. For this reason, the inquiry into whether the aid is "direct and
substantial" is necessary.
8
' Petitioners also cite Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 (1983), which upheld a general tax deduction available to parents of all school children for

83-990-0PINION
22

GRAND RAPIDS SCHOOL DISTRICT v. BALL

"flows to" the students, and petitioners' argument if accepted
would validate all forms of nonideological aid to religious
schools, including those explicitly rejected in our prior cases.
Yet in Meek, we held unconstitutional the loan of instructional materials to religious schools and in Wolman, we rejected the fiction that a similar program could be saved by
masking it as aid to individual students. Wolman, 433
U. S., at 249, n. 16. It follows afortiori that the aid here,
which includes not only instructional materials but also the
provision of instructional services by teachers in the
parochial school building, "inescapably [has] the primary ef- ·
feet of providing a direct and substantial advancement of the
sectarian enterprise." !d., at 250. Where, as here, no
meaningful distinction can be made between aid to the student and aid to the school, "the concept of a loan to individuals is a transparent fiction." Wolman v. Walter, id., at 264
(opinion of POWELL, J.).
Petitioners .also argue that this "subsidy" effect is not significant in this case, because the Community Education and
Shared Time programs supplemented the curriculum with
courses not previously offered in the religious schools and not
required by school rule or state regulation. Of course, this
fails to distinguish the programs here from those found unconstitutional in Meek. See 421 U. S., at 368. As in Meek,
we do not find that this feature of the program is controlling.
First, there is no way of knowing whether the religious
schools would have offered some or all of these courses if the
public school system had not offered them first. The distinction between courses that "supplement" and those that "supplant" the regular curriculum is therefore not nearly as clear
as petitioners allege. Second, although the precise courses
offered in these programs may have been new to the particischool expenses, including tuition to religious schools. Mueller, however,
is quite unlike the instant case. Unlike Mueller, the aid provided here is
unmediated by the tax code and the "numerous, private choices of individual parents of school-age children." !d., at 399.
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pating religious schools, their general subject matter-reading, math, etc.-was surely a part of the curriculum in the
past, and the concerns of the Establishment Clause may thus
be triggered despite the "supplemental" nature of the
courses. Cf. Meek v. Pittenger, supra, at 370-371. Third,
and most important, petitioners' argument would permit the
public schools gradually to take over the entire secular
curriculum of the religious school, for the latter could surely
discontinue existing courses so that they might be replaced a
year or two later by a Community Education or Shared Time
course with the same content. The average religious school
student, for instance, now spends 10 percent of the school
day in Shared Time classes. But there is no principled basis
on which this Court can impose a limit on the percentage of
the religious-school day that can be subsidized by the public
school. To let the genie out of the bottle in this case would
be to permit ever larger segments of the religious school
curriculum to be turned over to the public school system,
thus violating the cardinal principle that the State may not in
effect become the prime supporter of the religious school system. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S., at 624-625.

III
We conclude that the challenged programs have the effect
of promoting religion in three ways. 14 The state-paid instructors, influenced by the pervasively sectarian nature of
the religious schools in which they work, may subtly or
overtly indoctrinate the students in particular religious
tenets at public expense. The symbolic union of church and
state inherent in the provision of secular, state-provided instruction in the religious school buildings threatens to convey
a message of state support for religion to students and to the
14

Because of this conclusion, we need not determine whether aspects of
the challenged programs impermissibly entangle the government in religious matters, in violation of the third prong of the Lemon test. But see
Aguilar v. Felton, U. S. (1985).
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general public. Finally, the programs in effect subsidize the
religious functions of the parochial schools by taking over a
substantial portion of their responsibility for teaching secular
subjects. For these reasons, the conclusion is inescapable
that the Community Education and Shared Time programs
have the "primary or principal" effect of advancing religion,
and therefore violate the dictates of the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.
N onpublic schools have played an important role' in the
development of American education, and we have long recognized that parents and their children have the right to choose ·
between public schools and available sectarian alternatives.
As THE CHIEF JUSTICE noted in Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra,
at 625, "nothing we have said can be construed to disparage
the role of church-related elementary and secondary schools
in our national life. Their contribution has been and is enormous." But the Establishment Clause "rest[s] on the belief
that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion." Engel v. Vitale, 370
U. S., at 431 (1962). Therefore, "[t]he Constitution decrees
that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the
family, and the institutions of private choice, and that while
some involvement and entanglement are inevitable, lines
must be drawn." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 625. Because "the controlling constitutional standards have become
firmly rooted and the broad contours of our inquiry are now
well defined," Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,
413 U. S., at 761, the position of those lines has by now become quite clear and requires affirmance of the Court of
Appeals.
It is so ordered.
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STANFORD LAW SCHOOL

July 5, 1985

The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, DC 20543
Dear Lewis:
Many thanks for your notes of July 1.
The Stevas-Wong-Powell axis worked perfectly: the Friday opinions got
into my hands by late afternoon on that day, in ample time for our Saturday
morning session. Although most of the cases were not major ones for our
purposes, I sat up until the very late hours after the Friday night banquet
reading every word (and passing along a couple of them to my fellow
panelists before the Saturday morning session). That caused me to lose some
sleep, and I regretted that by about midnight Saturday our time, when we
were landing at San Francisco airport after a long drive from The Homestead
to Washington on Saturday afternoon and an even longer flight back that
evening.(Barbara had to be back here quickly in order to begin an intensive
summer course she is teaching now in lithography.) But we have recuperated
from that and I was very glad to have the opinions. Thanks again for your
help.
I am glad the establishment cases did not come down until Monday: if
they had come down Friday, as I feared they might, Dick Howard would have
had to rush back to Washington and would not have been able to J01n us
Saturday morning. I suppose Dick, who argued the Michigan case, is
especially pleased; but as a mere academic observer, I couldn't be more
delighted myself with the outcome. I have had some private arguments about
Geoff Stone's (of Chicago) comments in a lecture, really quite hysterical for
him, at the end of the last term, in Georgia, identifying the 1983 term as
one of those every generation turning point terms of the Court, and pointing
especially at the Rhode Island creche case to argue that, among other basic
rights, the establishment clause had bitten the dust. As you know, I have long
argued against jumping to cosmic conclusions on the basis of limited data,
but I must confess, after reading the Lynch opinion, I felt a bit shaky
myself. I am glad that this term's cases, and particularly last Monday'~
proved people like Geoff wrong.
Barbara and I really had a wonderful time at The Homestead. A Virginia
acquaintance who we ran into as we entered the hotel warned us that we
should not confuse The Homestead with present day Virginia -- that The

Gerald Gunther,
William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law
Crown Quadrangle
Stanford, California
94305

The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
July 5, 1985
Page 2
Homestead represented Virginia of two generations ago, not today. But we
spent a lot of time with present day Virginians at the Conference, and any
group that can preserve and enjoy as gracious and delightful a place as
The Homestead into the late 20th century has my admiration.
I began the Saturday morning session with my views on Garcia -- views
with which you are generally familiar, because they are a variant of what I
said in my formal speech to the D.C. Circuit. I was delighted that Dick
Howard, who spoke next, fully endorsed my position, although Walter
Dellinger~ criticized it, albeit not damagingly in my view.
Having a chance to meet Lewis III was one of the highlights of the
enjoyable days at The Homestead. I noticed on Thursday, when Barbara and I
spent a few minutes at the pool, that a Lewis Powell had signed in there,
together with half a dozen other couples. I walked around the sand trying
to identify him, rather suspected that it was the handsome young fellow
studiously reading a legal document (it turned out to be a deposition), but
was hesitant to disrupt his reading. Fortunately, we were introduced to him
soon after and we saw a good deal of him for the remainder of the
Conference.
We both enjoyed speaking with your very nice son and daughter-in-law.
Barbara spoke of him as not only one of the nicest and most gentle people
she had met, but also as just a "beautiful" young man physically. I assume
the latter remark stems from her artistic inclinations, and her role as a
teacher of life drawing courses. Even to my lay eye, he is truly a handsome
and engaging young man. I gathered that he is doing a good deal of business
right on the Stanford campus these days, in his work for Syntex, and I have
strongly urged him, if more depositions are in the offing, that he let us
know and give us a chance to see more of him out here. Indeed, with our
children out of the house, we have a number of spare beds, including a quite
adequate guest room, and I have urged him to make use of it whenever he can.
I look forward to seeing more of him here.
I will write Al Stevas a note to thank him for his help in getting the
opinions down to Hot Springs. The package on Wednesday morning was ready
for me at the back door, as we began our drive there. And, as I said, we
had the Thursday and Friday opinions by late Friday afternoon.
We do hope that you will get the maximum possible relaxation and rest
this summer, and that all will go well and speedily if you do have to return
to the hospital on the hernia. It was really very good to see you at the
Court.
With warm regards, and best wishes from both of us,
Sincerely,

·.
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Washington, DC 20016
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David 0 . Maxwell
Chairman of the Board and
Chief Executive Officer
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Justice Lewis Powell
550 N Street, SW
washington, DC
20024
Dear Justice Powell:
I have never known whether it was proper to comment
on the decisions of the Supreme Court from a
personal standpoint, but if not, I hope you will
forgive me for writing to express my gratitude
for your position in the recent cases involving
the separation of church and state in this country.
;

.

I have always felt that religion should be a
private affair, lest we risk the consequences
of that divisiveness and strife of which you
wrote so eloquently in your opinion.
Joan joins me in sending warmest regards to you
and Mrs. Powell.
Sincerely,
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